On Sunday, March 2, 2014 11:54:21 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 02 Mar 2014, at 17:10, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > On Sunday, March 2, 2014 3:46:07 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > 
> > On 01 Mar 2014, at 12:08, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > On Saturday, March 1, 2014 3:12:49 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > > 
> > > On 01 Mar 2014, at 02:36, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > > 
> > >> 
> > >> 
> > >> On Friday, February 28, 2014 5:32:48 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: 
> > >> "If it's all math, then where does math come from?" 
> > >> 
> > >> Strange to say, elementary maths just appears to be a fact. That 
> > >> is, it is a fact that 1+1=2. 
> > >> 
> > >> 
> > >> These shapes appear to be letters and words also, but they aren't. 
> > >> All it takes is a small chemical change in your brain and 1+1 could 
> > >> = mustard. 
> > > 
> > > It can change your mind into believing that 1+1=mustard, but 1+1 
> > > would still be equal to 2. 
> > > 
> > > Not if you were the only mind left in the universe. 
> > 
> > You confirm your tendency toward solipsism. I assume by default that I 
> > am not the only mind left in the universe, and even if that was the 
> > case, this would not imply that 1+1=2, because this does not depend on 
> > me at all. 
> > 
> > If you were the only mind in the universe though, you are what   
> > everything depends on. 
>
> You have to learn logic. 
>

Sometimes you have to set logic aside to come to your senses.
 

>
>
>
> > There would be nothing else but you which could know anything or   
> > experience anything. If you are the only presence there is, then you   
> > are the only truth there is. 
>
> Wrong. 
>

Why?
 

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>
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> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > >> Even in a completely normative state of mind, 1+1 = 2 doesn't apply 
> > >> to everything. 
> > > 
> > > 1+1=2 independently of the misused that someone can do with that 
> > > theory. 
> > > 
> > > Nothing can "=" anything independently of sense. 
> > 
> > This contradicts the whole field of logic, which precisely shows the 
> > contrary. 
> > 
> > Yes. Logic is a minimalist reflection of sense. 
>
> I am afraid you have to learn logic. 
>

I am afraid that is a dodge.
 

>
>
>
>
> > Logic is local truth. 
>
> Nope. 
>

If it weren't, then you couldn't get away from logic in altered states of 
consciousness. It's quite easy to get away from logic, but there is no 
getting away from sense.
 

>
>
>
> > It can never include sense itself let alone the absolute   
> > (pansensitivity). Mirrors show the light reflecting off of the   
> > water, but there is no water there. "=" is a myth of representation.   
> > For authentic presence, there is only 'reminds me of' or 'seems   
> > almost exactly like'. 
> > 
> > 
> > The notion of proof is made independent on semantics, when 
> > possible, by the completeness and soundness theorem available for a 
> > vats class of theories (like those formalized in first order 
> > language). In that case "1+1=2" will be a law, valid in all models of 
> > the theory. 
> > 
> > Yes, it makes sense within the context of the theory that it lives   
> > in, which is a very popular, common sense theory, but it is still   
> > only a map, and it is a map of distance and measure, not of   
> > experience. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > >> Once cloud plus one cloud equals one large cloud, or maybe one 
> > >> raining cloud. Math is about a very specific aspect of sense - the 
> > >> sense which objects make when we count them. 
> > > 
> > > No math can study clouds too. Cf Mandelbrot. 
> > > 
> > > Clouds can be counted from a distance, but not when we are traveling 
> > > through them. The effectiveness of math is directly proportional to 
> > > the objectivity of the phenomenon being modeled. 
> > 
> > It is just that we are not interested in counting clouds, but in their 
> > fractal nature, Hausdorff dimension, etc. 
> > 
> > Haha, exactly. Counting is only for countable things.   
> > Computationalism is not interested in counting feelings (how many   
> > feelings do you have? How many now?), yet it presumes to attribute   
> > feeling to a consequence of counting, using logic that has no idea   
> > what feeling could be. What hubris! 
>
> Straw man. 
>
>
"You have to learn logic. Wrong. you have to learn logic. Nope. Straw man."

These aren't answers. You're just putting your fingers in your ears.
  

>
>
>
>
>
> > 
> > I do think that feelings and other qualia can be modeled, but we   
> > have to meet them halfway: 
> > 
> > http://s33light.org/post/77942035998 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > >> That sense is abstracted into a language which extends it beyond 
> > >> literal objects to virtual objects, 
> > > 
> > > If literal objects exists, but there are no evidences, and such an 
> > > hypothesis introduces difficulties which have no use. 
> > > 
> > > A real bucket is a literal object. A formula which describes a 
> > > bucket-like shape is a virtual object. I don't see any difficulties. 
> > 
> > A "real" bucket? I don't know what that is. 
> > 
> > It has all of the aesthetic qualities that we expect of a bucket, as   
> > well as what is expected by the microphysical conditions that make   
> > up the bucket. 
>
> Ah! 
> []p & p. 
> Good! 
>
> Assuming comp, the microphysical is first person plural, as Everett   
> confirms, and I can prove that real persons meet real buckets in   
> arithmetic. 
>

Arithmetic can be true, but not real. Only experiences can be real, and 
arithmetic can have no experiences. Mathematics is the measurement of 
distance between experiences, not experiences themselves. The reflections 
of distance are sensible to the measurer, but that's it.
 

>
>
> > 
> > 
> > "real" is what is under 
> > investigation. If I knew what "real" meant, I would stop doing 
> > research (like you apparently). 
> > 
> > Real is the density of aesthetic correspondence relative to the   
> > total continuum of sense. 
>
> Really? 
>

Sure. Isn't it?
 

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>
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > >> but no matter what you do with math, it has no subjective interior. 
> > > 
> > > You don't know that. 
> > > 
> > > I don't claim to know it, I only say that it makes more sense and 
> > > that I have heard no convincing argument to the contrary. 
> > 
> > Read our posts. Or read my papers, which provides a string evidence to 
> > the contrary, notably in the math part. 
> > 
> > That's math though. I don't see that it has any connection to the   
> > universe that we live in. 
>
> You just cut the connection for it, like the Church. 
>

It never had a connection to awareness to begin with. It has a connection 
to disconnection.
 

>
>
>
>
>
> > 
> > The fact that machine cannot 
> > see the equivalence between []p and []p & p already entails a tension, 
> > in the virgin Löbian machine, between its interior and exterior 
> > conception of itself. Machines have already a left and right brain, 
> > and I guess the bilaterality of brains exploits this in specializing 
> > the hemisphere into []p and []p & p. Their logics are quite different. 
> > 
> > It makes sense to me that machines could have bilateral   
> > functionality. So does a walnut though. 
>
> It makes sense I stop answering as you begin to look like a trol. 
>

I don't see that you have been answering.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno 
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>
>
>
>

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