On 27 Mar 2014, at 23:37, LizR wrote:

On 27 March 2014 23:42, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
On 27 March 2014 19:11, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 26 Mar 2014, at 22:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:
On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental states.
>

Steady on, I don't think it does that at all, unless you constrain the
physical world to be bounded somehow in both space and time.

I think you were just trying to say that the space of brains (and
mental states) is discrete, something I could agree with.

Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite number of possible brains even in an infinite universe.
Assuming comp. If the brain is defined by its "material" quantum state, and assuming electron position is a continuous observable, then we can have an infinity of brains, even when limiting their size.

Is electron position a continuous observable? Even if it is and there are an infinity of brains, why should that result in an infinity of minds? It would seem unlikely that brains would evolve so that an arbitrarily small change in the position of an electron would cause a change in consciousness, and we know that even gross changes in the brain, as occur in stroke or head injury, sometimes have remarkably little effect.

I think Bruno must have a materialist hat on here?!

Excellent observation! In this context I assume some no-comp, and matter, and real numbers, etc. I can do that too :) It is the context of trying to understand what Stathis is saying, in a proper generalization of comp (still a bit fuzzy to me).




In comp the substitution level isn't necessarily at the level of individual electrons, surely...

The weak comp I consider is neutral on this, as long as the role of the minimal element is Turing emulable. It could the level of branes or strings, the consequences would still follow.

Non-comp needs to give a role to an actual infinities "with *all* its decimals.





But that raises another question, for me at least - in comp are there only finitely many possible states of mind?


They are a priori infinite enumerable. But for some you need *gigantic* brain. Well, they do exist in arithmetic.




So one would literally be able to travel full circle through all possible minds - eventually?


The UD does that, and although there are many "circles", there are also "spirales", complex infinite histories which never close on itself. It is hard to conclude, as the 1p and 3p relation is complex, but infinite self-complexifying conscious state cannot be excluded easily neither. A zoom in the mandelbrot set illustrates never-ending self- complification. The more a tiny Mandelbrot set is tiny, the more and more complex will be its filaments.

For example:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iL8iZ7lcVnk  (3 minutes, + sound).
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PD2XgQOyCCk   (16 minutes silent zoom).


Bruno




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