On Friday, April 4, 2014 2:07:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 04 Apr 2014, at 03:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Thursday, April 3, 2014 2:34:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 02 Apr 2014, at 21:34, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, April 2, 2014 1:00:54 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 01 Apr 2014, at 21:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > I believe you, but all of the laws and creativity can still only occur in > the context of a sense making experience. > > > Did I ever said the contrary? > > > Yes, you are saying that multiplication and addition laws prefigure sense > making and sense experience. > > > It makes the minimal sense *you* need to understand what we talk about. > That sense has already been studied and has itself some mathematical > representation. > Then, once you have the numbers, and the laws of + and *, you can prove > the existence of the universal numbers and their computations. The > universal numbers are the sense discovering machine. > > > It doesn't matter how minimal the sense is by our standards. In that frame > of reference, before we exist, it is much sense as there could ever be. If > there is sense to make + and *, then numbers can only act as conduit to > shape that sense, not to create it. You're interested in understanding > numbers, but I'm only interested in understanding the sense that makes > everything (including, but not limited to numbers). > > > You ignore the discovery that numbers can understand and make sense of > many things, with reasonable and understandable definitions (with some > work). > > > Just as we depend our eyes to make sense of our retinal cells sense, so to > do numbers act as lenses and filters to capture sense for us. That does not > mean that what sense is made through numbers belong to numbers. > > > > Of course. Comp might be false. ~comp, we agree on this since the start. > But it does not add anything to your []~comp. You persist to confuse > ~[]comp and []~comp. > > > I'm not confusing them, I'm saying that []~comp is not untrue > > > this means you say []~comp is true. >
Yes. > > Or that you confuse, like you did already "truth" and knowledge, but in > that case you keep saying that you know []~comp, yet your argument above > was only for ~[]comp, on which I already agree, as it is a consequence of > comp. > I'm not saying that I know it, I'm saying that it makes more sense. > > > > just because it is outside of logic. When you arbitrarily begin from the > 3p perspective, you can only see the flatland version of 1p intuition. You > would have to consider the possibility that numbers can come from this kind > of intuition and not the other way around. If you put your fingers in your > ears, and only listen to formalism, then you can only hear what formalism > has to say about intuition, which is... not much. > > > Why? > Because of the incompleteness of all formal systems. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > All that can still make sense in the theory according to which sense is a > gift by Santa Klaus. > > And this is not an argument against your theory, nor against the existence > of Santa Klaus. > > Concerning your theory, I find it uninteresting because it abandons my > entire field of inquiry: making sense of sense. > > > I don't think abandoned as much as frees it from trying to do the > impossible. I see mathematics as being even more useful when we know that > it is safe from gaining autonomous intent. > > > > Comp implies that Arithmetic is not free of autonomous intent, trivially. > But computer science provides many realities capable of justifying or > defining autonomous intent. > > > I was talking about the theory of comp being over-extended to try to > explain qualia and awareness. > > > > It helps to formulate the problems, and provides way to test indirect > predictions. > > But again you are pursuing the confusion between ~[]comp and []~comp. > > > There's no confusion. If comp cannot justify actual qualia, but ~comp can, > then we should give ~comp the benefit of the doubt. > > > > comp implies that ~comp has the benefits of the doubt. I told you this > many times. > As I just repeated above, this does not refute comp. > > > What does it mean to give it the benefit of the doubt but then deny it? > > > > You are the only one who deny a theory here. > By saying that ~comp is only what seems true from the machine's 1p perspective, you are denying ~comp can be more true than comp. > > I never said that comp is true, or that comp is false. I say only that > comp leads to a Plato/aristotle reversal, to be short. > We agree on this from the start, but what I am saying is that Plato also can be reversed on the lower level, so that the ideal/arithmetic is generated statistically by aesthetics. > > But *you* say that comp is false, and that is why we ask you an argument. > The argument has to be understandable, and not of the type "let us abandon > logic and ...", which is like "God told me ...", and has zero argumentative > value. > We don't have to abandon logic, but we have to understand that the source of logic is not necessarily going to be logical. This is what most people get from Godel. The truth does not require argumentation value. If I said that I have a theory that horses pull carts rather than the other way around, does its lack of argumentative value make it less true? > > > > > > Comp is Gödelian. It behaves like "consistency" (~[]f, <>t), which entails > the consistency of its negation: <>t -> <>[]f. > > > Not sure what you mean. Maybe if you wrote it out without symbols. > > > If I am consistent then it is consistent that I am not consistent. (I = > the 3p notion of self). > How is "I" a 3p notion of self? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > But in logic and computer science, we do have theories relating > formula/theories/machine and some mathematical notion senses (models, > interpretation, valuation) usually infinite or transfinite. > > But I have never said that you are wrong with your theory. Only that the > use of your theory to refute computationalism is not valid. > > > Not valid by what epistemology though? > > > Yes, that is your problem. You seem unaware of the most simple universal > standard, which are basically either classical logic, or another logic, but > then made explicit. > > > It's not that I'm not aware, it's that I think it doesn't work for > consciousness unless you beg the question by assuming that consciousness > comes from logic. > > > > Then you become non sensical, at least for the others. Somehow you confess > you have to abandon logic to make my sun in law into a zombie. > > You make my point. > > > You make my point also. Your view assumes that we must judge consciousness > by the standard of logic, > > > I never said that, on the contrary. > > > What part of your view allows consciousness to be addressed outside of its > logical entailments? > > > The decision to say "yes" to the doctor. > What would a UM say to the doctor? > The machine's decision to add a self-consistency axiom and become another > machine. > The direct introspection of the machine, when she feels what is out of any > possible justification. > That is formalized by the the annuli Z* \ Z, X* \ X, etc. > > Yes, mathematical logic provides tools to meta-formalizes some non > formalizable, by the machine, predicate which are still applying on the > machine. > Whether it is formal or meta-formal, it's still logic. It remains a view of consciousness that lacks aesthetic presence and is limited to programmatic states of figuring and configuring. > > > > > > > > > even though we know from the start that our access to logic depends on > consciousness. Your sun in law is animated doll, and you must amputate my > circle of sense to the digital square in order to make him seem human. > > > On the contrary. I justify why the machine has no "amputation of sense" to > do. > > > But you justify it by defining sense in an amputated way so that it does > nothing but serve math. > > > > You do the amputation. For you, in 1985, when my sun in law got the > digital brain, you stop to attribute any sense to his talk. > > You are the one making it into a doll. He made a wonderful carrier (in > nuclear physics), makes my daughter happy, have two children, but *you* > tell me that he is dead. > He's already dead, I'm just saying that I'm not fooled, even if your daughter's mistakes make her happy. > > You don't have the monopoly on a word like sense. And you should not > confuse a theory of sense with sense, and a simple theory of sense if given > by machine's intensional self-references, and so your move to evacuate it > by abandoning logic just to "kill" my sun-in-law confirms my point. > I don't try to have a theory of sense, I try to address sense as it actually seems to be. I don't think that any simple theory of sense given by logic can do anything but obstruct our understanding...unless we use it as an example of how sense works to obstruct itself, which it does. > > You need to abandon logic to be argue that some talk by some entities does > not make sense. > Only if you are blind to the pathetic fallacy. For most people, it is pretty cleat that just because words can be made to come out of a machine in the correct order, it doesn't mean that the machine understands what it is saying. Most people understand that voice mail can't really listen to you, aren't really being polite, etc. There's nothing there behind the woman's voice that is a woman. It does make sense, but at a much lower level, so that the imitation of high level sense is a pseudo-aesthetic presentation. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > It begs the question if you use the logic that gives rise to comp to > refute a conjecture that explicitly questions logic as primordial. > > > > If you refute comp with a non standard logic, you have to make it > explicit. > > > I do make it explicit. In the matter of 1p awareness, I refute all > possible logic with the deeper reality of sense. > > > Good 1p intuition, but the machine already knows that, and they can know > that this cannot been used to justify that they are (necessarily unknown > for them) machines/numbers. > > > Isn't that an argument from authority, where the authority is how you > interpret hypothetical machines states of mind? Saying that machines know > that my view is wrong does not help. I can say that kangaroos know that > your view is wrong. > > > Machines derives your view for their 1p. This is justified in detail. > > > You continue to push this bizarre arguments. You are the brown egg saying > 'it makes sense that eggs are white by default'. > > > I agree that argument is a bit diabolical. But comp explains why comp is > not believable, and even why comp is false from the 1p view. > Yet you forbid my diabolical argument that sense cannot be sliced into logic without losing the most important part. My view also explains why comp is not believable, and why it would seem true from the 3p view. > > That is why I insist that saying "yes" to the doctor involves some faith, > and courage, and that comp has theological consequences, that we can study > on PA, which in comp is an Escherichia Coli for the study of soul and body. > I don't see that comp allows any faith or courage...just mechanism acting on arithmetic function and senseless whims with no consequence to it. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > But you will have to motivate the use of that logic, > > > Why would I have to motivate the use of sense if I don't have to motivate > the use of standard logic? All I have to do is stop presuming that math can > make color and then begin to understand why. > > > But comp explains why. > > > Then show me a new color. You can't do it. If I said 'show me how to solve > Rubik's cube', you could. > > > Machines can already explain why. Anyway, what you say does not > distinguish silicon and organic bodies on the consciousness matter. > > > It's not the composition of the matter that is the problem, its what the > composition represents. Authenticity is more fundamental than matter or > information. > > > Why should my sun-in-law be no more authentic after its prosthetic > operation? > Because you killed him when you replaced the brain that has been constructed since the beginning of time as his one and only connection to express himself in 3p and replaced it with an imitation that is missing billions of years of experience as living organisms. > > > > > > > > > > I keep explaining that arithmetic seen from inside escapes somehow the > mathematics accessible to the machine. > > > No need to keep explaining, I understood from the beginning. I'm > suggesting that the 'somehow' is due to the machine actually being a > reduced set of qualia. Arithmetic is a machine run by sense. > > > No problem with such suggestion, but a suggestion is not a refutation. > > > A refutation may not be possible because comp is too autistic. It refuses > to accept any arguments that are not defined in purely logical terms. > Insensitivity defines sensitivity in a trivial way. > > > False. It accepts any valid argument. You did not present one. > You're just affirming what I said. Why do you assume that the truth must be a valid argument? Some truths are experiential and aesthetic. They appear before logic and cognition. > You just tell us that you know that, but that is not an argument. > I don't say I know it, I say that it makes more sense. > Nor do you present a theory, in the usual informal sense used by > scientists, which you criticize as having inadequate tools, but then you > put yourself out of the dialog. > Yes, the dialog is the problem. You have to take off the sunglasses to see all of the light. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > and it seems that changing the logic to refute comp, is like trying to > rotate the solar system to be in front of your computer (it is simpler to > rotate yourself). > > > I'm not changing the logic, I'm denying that it is relevant. > > > This is worst than "don't ask". It is: "let us be irrational". > > > Let us be rational in understanding the trans-rational, but do not limit > ourselves to the rationality of strict logic. > > > > = "give me some amount of illogicalness so that I can keep up my prejudice > against machine"; > > > "Let me disallow all but strictly logical terms so I can keep up my > prejudice against consciousness". > > > > UDA is informal, and I hope valid. AUDA uses mathematical logic and > theoretical computer science, which uses are of course invited when you > assume computationalism. > > It seems again like if you do have a prejudice against my sun in law, and > other possible machines, ability to manifest personal consciousness. > It's not a prejudice, it's an understanding. Consciousness need not be manifested by anything, let alone machines. Consciousness is manifestation itself. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Consciousness is what we are looking for and consciousness is required > before logic. > > > Like the far away galaxies are required before the telescope, but that > does not make the telescope irrelevant to detect the galaxies. > > > No, but the galaxies are not defined by what a telescope detects. An array > of telescopes cannot create a galaxy. > > > Nor can logic create consciousness, but still be useful to reason about > consciousness. You make my point, again. > > > It be useful to reason about consciousness to a point, but it doesn't go > all the way, > > > Hmm... OK. Incompleteness valid this. > :) > > > > and it doesn't know why it can't go all the way. Surely incompleteness > validates this. > > > > No. the machine can be aware of its own incompleteness and understand why > it doesn't go all the way, but also why this makes the possible "outside" > productive and very rich. > How do you know that a machine that can't feel (like a voice mail machine) knows that it can't feel? Why would a more sophisticated machine be any different in that regard? ... Craig > > > > > > > > > > > Logic is just required to be able to argue with others, and you do use it, > it seems to me, except that you seem to decide opportunistically to not > apply it to "refute" comp. > > > Comp can't be refuted logicall > > ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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