On 05 Apr 2014, at 19:09, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, April 4, 2014 2:07:47 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Apr 2014, at 03:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, April 3, 2014 2:34:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I'm not confusing them, I'm saying that []~comp is not untrue
this means you say []~comp is true.
Yes.
Nice.
Or that you confuse, like you did already "truth" and knowledge, but
in that case you keep saying that you know []~comp, yet your
argument above was only for ~[]comp, on which I already agree, as it
is a consequence of comp.
I'm not saying that I know it, I'm saying that it makes more sense.
But then why are we discussing?
Then, as I said, comp makes no sense from the 1p, which in comp is the
sense-maker, which makes your point logically in favor of comp.
just because it is outside of logic. When you arbitrarily begin from
the 3p perspective, you can only see the flatland version of 1p
intuition. You would have to consider the possibility that numbers
can come from this kind of intuition and not the other way around.
If you put your fingers in your ears, and only listen to formalism,
then you can only hear what formalism has to say about intuition,
which is... not much.
Why?
Because of the incompleteness of all formal systems.
But this is based on arithmetic.
comp implies that ~comp has the benefits of the doubt. I told you
this many times.
As I just repeated above, this does not refute comp.
What does it mean to give it the benefit of the doubt but then deny
it?
You are the only one who deny a theory here.
By saying that ~comp is only what seems true from the machine's 1p
perspective, you are denying ~comp can be more true than comp.
I am just saying that the non comp feeling is normal with comp, and
cannot be used to refute logically comp. I am not denying non-comp.
Not at all.
I never said that comp is true, or that comp is false. I say only
that comp leads to a Plato/aristotle reversal, to be short.
We agree on this from the start, but what I am saying is that Plato
also can be reversed on the lower level, so that the ideal/
arithmetic is generated statistically by aesthetics.
Derive 1 = 1 in your theory. Show me the theory first.
But *you* say that comp is false, and that is why we ask you an
argument. The argument has to be understandable, and not of the type
"let us abandon logic and ...", which is like "God told me ...", and
has zero argumentative value.
We don't have to abandon logic, but we have to understand that the
source of logic is not necessarily going to be logical. This is what
most people get from Godel.
We knew this already. The choice of theories are not 100% logical. We
don't need Gödel for this.
The truth does not require argumentation value.
Very plausibly. That part can be related to Tarski or Gödel limitation
theorem, although very often the arguments are not valid, but
sometimes it is.
If I said that I have a theory that horses pull carts rather than
the other way around, does its lack of argumentative value make it
less true?
Lack of justfication can make it less plausible, compared to a theory
with more justification. That is a very contextual questions,
depending on many things.
Comp is Gödelian. It behaves like "consistency" (~[]f, <>t), which
entails the consistency of its negation: <>t -> <>[]f.
Not sure what you mean. Maybe if you wrote it out without symbols.
If I am consistent then it is consistent that I am not consistent.
(I = the 3p notion of self).
How is "I" a 3p notion of self?
It is not. Only here. I was just saying that I was using "I" in the 3p
sense of the self. In that case, the "I" is given by the body or the
code of the entity saying "I" (by definition).
The decision to say "yes" to the doctor.
What would a UM say to the doctor?
The 1-I will say no, and the 3-I might say yes. The UM will live a
conflict, and only its education might help to decide, in one or the
other direction.
The machine's decision to add a self-consistency axiom and become
another machine.
The direct introspection of the machine, when she feels what is out
of any possible justification.
That is formalized by the the annuli Z* \ Z, X* \ X, etc.
Yes, mathematical logic provides tools to meta-formalizes some non
formalizable, by the machine, predicate which are still applying on
the machine.
Whether it is formal or meta-formal, it's still logic.
Not really. Logic is applied, but is not the subject of the inquiry.
As you said above, arithmetic is not entirely logical.
It remains a view of consciousness that lacks aesthetic presence
That is the statement I am quite skeptical about, and that you should
justify, at least the day you pretend that comp is false (not today).
and is limited to programmatic states of figuring and configuring.
It concerns both the 1p, and its relation with some 3p. You are the
one conflating them, but that beg the question of why we should
conflate them.
even though we know from the start that our access to logic depends
on consciousness. Your sun in law is animated doll, and you must
amputate my circle of sense to the digital square in order to make
him seem human.
On the contrary. I justify why the machine has no "amputation of
sense" to do.
But you justify it by defining sense in an amputated way so that it
does nothing but serve math.
You do the amputation. For you, in 1985, when my sun in law got the
digital brain, you stop to attribute any sense to his talk.
You are the one making it into a doll. He made a wonderful carrier
(in nuclear physics), makes my daughter happy, have two children,
but *you* tell me that he is dead.
He's already dead, I'm just saying that I'm not fooled, even if your
daughter's mistakes make her happy.
That's my point. Your theory amputes the sense that my sun-in-law is
able to make, in the comp theory.
You don't have the monopoly on a word like sense. And you should not
confuse a theory of sense with sense, and a simple theory of sense
if given by machine's intensional self-references, and so your move
to evacuate it by abandoning logic just to "kill" my sun-in-law
confirms my point.
I don't try to have a theory of sense, I try to address sense as it
actually seems to be.
Yes, that is what I criticize. You project your conception of sense to
others.
I don't think that any simple theory of sense given by logic
It is not given by logic, it is only maintained by the assumption that
at some description level we are Turing emulable. And then the math,
in that theory, explain why indeed that is not a logical move, and why
it asks for a "religious" sort of act of faith.
can do anything but obstruct our understanding...unless we use it as
an example of how sense works to obstruct itself, which it does.
You need to abandon logic to be argue that some talk by some
entities does not make sense.
Only if you are blind to the pathetic fallacy.
You comment yourself here.
For most people, it is pretty cleat that just because words can be
made to come out of a machine in the correct order, it doesn't mean
that the machine understands what it is saying. Most people
understand that voice mail can't really listen to you, aren't really
being polite, etc. There's nothing there behind the woman's voice
that is a woman. It does make sense, but at a much lower level, so
that the imitation of high level sense is a pseudo-aesthetic
presentation.
For most people it has been pretty clear that the sun moves in the
sky. Then comp explains why ~comp is pretty clear.
It begs the question if you use the logic that gives rise to comp to
refute a conjecture that explicitly questions logic as primordial.
If you refute comp with a non standard logic, you have to make it
explicit.
I do make it explicit. In the matter of 1p awareness, I refute all
possible logic with the deeper reality of sense.
Good 1p intuition, but the machine already knows that, and they can
know that this cannot been used to justify that they are
(necessarily unknown for them) machines/numbers.
Isn't that an argument from authority, where the authority is how
you interpret hypothetical machines states of mind? Saying that
machines know that my view is wrong does not help. I can say that
kangaroos know that your view is wrong.
Machines derives your view for their 1p. This is justified in detail.
You continue to push this bizarre arguments. You are the brown egg
saying 'it makes sense that eggs are white by default'.
I agree that argument is a bit diabolical. But comp explains why
comp is not believable, and even why comp is false from the 1p view.
Yet you forbid my diabolical argument that sense cannot be sliced
into logic without losing the most important part.
Indeed, that would be a reduction of ([]p & p) to []p.
My view also explains why comp is not believable, and why it would
seem true from the 3p view.
That is why I insist that saying "yes" to the doctor involves some
faith, and courage, and that comp has theological consequences, that
we can study on PA, which in comp is an Escherichia Coli for the
study of soul and body.
I don't see that comp allows any faith or courage...just mechanism
acting on arithmetic function and senseless whims with no
consequence to it.
here you do reduce the machine to its []p, and abstract from its []p &
p. You could say that you don't see a qualia inside a brain, or inside
carbon, etc. You just adopt a double standard distinguishing silicon
machine and carbon machines.
But you will have to motivate the use of that logic,
Why would I have to motivate the use of sense if I don't have to
motivate the use of standard logic? All I have to do is stop
presuming that math can make color and then begin to understand why.
But comp explains why.
Then show me a new color. You can't do it. If I said 'show me how to
solve Rubik's cube', you could.
Machines can already explain why. Anyway, what you say does not
distinguish silicon and organic bodies on the consciousness matter.
It's not the composition of the matter that is the problem, its what
the composition represents. Authenticity is more fundamental than
matter or information.
Why should my sun-in-law be no more authentic after its prosthetic
operation?
Because you killed him when you replaced the brain that has been
constructed since the beginning of time as his one and only
connection to express himself in 3p and replaced it with an
imitation that is missing billions of years of experience as living
organisms.
If you say that his brain has been build from the beginning of time, I
can say the same for the computer.
I keep explaining that arithmetic seen from inside escapes somehow
the mathematics accessible to the machine.
No need to keep explaining, I understood from the beginning. I'm
suggesting that the 'somehow' is due to the machine actually being a
reduced set of qualia. Arithmetic is a machine run by sense.
No problem with such suggestion, but a suggestion is not a refutation.
A refutation may not be possible because comp is too autistic. It
refuses to accept any arguments that are not defined in purely
logical terms. Insensitivity defines sensitivity in a trivial way.
False. It accepts any valid argument. You did not present one.
You're just affirming what I said. Why do you assume that the truth
must be a valid argument?
Truth is not a valid argument. It is not an argument to begin with. It
is a valuation of a statement. A semantics.
Some truths are experiential and aesthetic.
You confuse p and []p & p.
They appear before logic and cognition.
At which level, in what sense of "before"? I need a theory to make
sense of such terms.
You just tell us that you know that, but that is not an argument.
I don't say I know it, I say that it makes more sense.
That is a progress. It makes more sense to machine too. But "more
sense" is not an argument, especially in this context.
Nor do you present a theory, in the usual informal sense used by
scientists, which you criticize as having inadequate tools, but then
you put yourself out of the dialog.
Yes, the dialog is the problem. You have to take off the sunglasses
to see all of the light.
and it seems that changing the logic to refute comp, is like trying
to rotate the solar system to be in front of your computer (it is
simpler to rotate yourself).
I'm not changing the logic, I'm denying that it is relevant.
This is worst than "don't ask". It is: "let us be irrational".
Let us be rational in understanding the trans-rational, but do not
limit ourselves to the rationality of strict logic.
= "give me some amount of illogicalness so that I can keep up my
prejudice against machine";
"Let me disallow all but strictly logical terms so I can keep up my
prejudice against consciousness".
UDA is informal, and I hope valid. AUDA uses mathematical logic and
theoretical computer science, which uses are of course invited when
you assume computationalism.
It seems again like if you do have a prejudice against my sun in
law, and other possible machines, ability to manifest personal
consciousness.
It's not a prejudice, it's an understanding. Consciousness need not
be manifested by anything, let alone machines. Consciousness is
manifestation itself.
Consciousness is what we are looking for and consciousness is
required before logic.
Like the far away galaxies are required before the telescope, but
that does not make the telescope irrelevant to detect the galaxies.
No, but the galaxies are not defined by what a telescope detects. An
array of telescopes cannot create a galaxy.
Nor can logic create consciousness, but still be useful to reason
about consciousness. You make my point, again.
It be useful to reason about consciousness to a point, but it
doesn't go all the way,
Hmm... OK. Incompleteness valid this.
:)
and it doesn't know why it can't go all the way. Surely
incompleteness validates this.
No. the machine can be aware of its own incompleteness and
understand why it doesn't go all the way, but also why this makes
the possible "outside" productive and very rich.
How do you know that a machine that can't feel (like a voice mail
machine) knows that it can't feel?
I know nothing (publicly communicable). I just tell you what I assume,
and what I derive from the assumption.
But I thought you were saying that you have an argument showing that
step 0 (comp) is invalid at the start.
I am happy you admit being less certain, on this, and my sun in law
who read your posts told me that is a bit of a relief.
Why would a more sophisticated machine be any different in that
regard?
A voice mail machine does not seem to implement a universal machine
believing in some induction principles, like PA, ZF.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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