On Tue, Apr 08, 2014 at 06:05:44PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: > >> > >Then why claim that there is an external ontological reality at all, > >if all you're banging on about is intersubjective consistency? It > >doesn't buy you anything, except unanswerable questions. > > It's like Bruno's 'comp', it's a model or assumption from which you > reason. It's a good model for explaining why there is > intersubjective consistency. I suppose you might also have a > solipist model which would explain the consistency as, "I thought of > it all and I'm consistent and I want people to agree with me so > that's the way I think'em." >
I can see that, but it is also equally valid that one doesn't need either hypothesis. Certainly it is sufficient that if the properties of observed reality is constrained by one's act of observation, then any other observed putative observers must report observations of a reality constrained in the same way. Hence intersubjective consistency. -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
