On 4/8/2014 5:28 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Apr 08, 2014 at 10:21:36AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/8/2014 5:36 AM, aeternadei D. wrote:
To argue your case, you would need to come up with some physical
property that is indubitably _not_ a consequence of how we perceive
the world. I don't think you can do that. It is a very high standard
of proof. Consequently, it does not follow that intersubjective
consistency necessarily implies the existence of some external
ontological reality.
Cheers
Quantum mechanics is so counterintuitive I'd say that it is not a
consequence of 'how we see the world'. In fact it's difficult to
explain how we see the world as we do given QM. This is known as
the classical-from-quantum problem.
In that case it should be quite easy to show what is wrong with my
derivation of QM given in "Why Occam's Razor" or appendix D of my
book.
That derivation is exactly in the form of a proof that quantum
mechanics is a consequence of "how we see the world". It is also not
very long, and only requires a modicum of functional analysis,
accessible to anybody who has studied quantum mechanics.
I'll read it.
To say that an external ontological reality does not necessarily
follow from intersubjective consistency is just setting the bar too
high. Theories of the world are inductive inventions and cannot
provide logical necessity. It's like asking that we prove the world
is Euclidean.
Brent
Then why claim that there is an external ontological reality at all,
if all you're banging on about is intersubjective consistency? It
doesn't buy you anything, except unanswerable questions.
It's like Bruno's 'comp', it's a model or assumption from which you reason. It's a good
model for explaining why there is intersubjective consistency. I suppose you might also
have a solipist model which would explain the consistency as, "I thought of it all and I'm
consistent and I want people to agree with me so that's the way I think'em."
Brent
To be fair, I don't think you do this Brent, but some people do:
Edgar, Colin Hales and David Deutsch, to name a few.
Cheers
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