On 18 May 2014, at 16:50, Richard Ruquist wrote:
On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 18 May 2014, at 05:41, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Hibbs,
I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It
seems to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it
predicts MWI.
The argument says that comp (believed by 99,9% of scientists today)
entails the MWI. OK.
Not OK and not true.
OK. I can agree. What is a world anyway?
Nevertheless, it is easy, even in Robinson arithmetic, to prove the
existence *all* finite piece of computations. Then assuming
computationalism, we have already our problem.
My *relative* consciousness is determined by all computations in which
I feel personally to survive (the global FPI on the sigma_1 complete
part of the arithmetical reality).
From the first person views, seen in some 3 views, that is more
coherent with a many worlds *views* of reality.
It is indeed an open problem if some type of computations winning the
limit come to singularize a unique physical reality, defining somehow
from inside a unique physical universe, but that becomes a very
complex question.
There are deep relation between number theory and string theory, and
knot theory too. That might help to extracts more information for the
lives of the relative universal numbers in Arithmetic.
But it predicts much more than the MWI. It predicts, with the use of
the classical definition of knowledge (used by most analytical
philosopher), the precise possible logic of observability (Z1*, or
S4Grz1, or X1*). In fact we get different physical realms (probably
the physics in heaven, earth, and many intermediate realms, ...).
Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable.
I disagree. If you assume mechanism, the two-slits experience is
enough test of the MW or MC(*)for me. I use "world" is the sense of
a reality as real as what I can observe here and now with quasi-
certainty, not in the sense of some ontology, as you know "I
believe" only in natural numbers, and in Einstein reality definition.
The two-slit experiment does not test MWI because the detectors all
select the same world. All controlled experiments select a single
world.
From the first person points of view. That is correct, and predicted
by computationalism (and by Everett in QM), the observer does not feel
the split, nor the stopping.
QM is a relief for a classical computationalist, as it is a witness we
do share a substitution level, and we do share a common universal
history. QM protects comp from solipsism, and illustrates the
existence of a solid first person plural. If ever god duplicate me, he
duplicates you too. The quantum superposition are just very contagious.
Then the meta-arithmetical theorems (Gödel, Löb, Solovay, Boolos,
Goldblatt, Visser) shows that a logic of certainties, for Löbian
number are given by the Theaetetus definitions, which are also the
simplest common sense notion, well, applied *from* the understanding
of the UDA.
Incompleteness forces the machine to distinguish truth and belief, and
forces the distinction between belief ([]p), knowledge ([]p & p), bet
([]p & <>t), and normally you should get the physical laws on the bet
on all sigma_1 sentences.
You do get indeed an arithmetical quantum logic (well, actually three,
and even a graded set of quantum logics, for the []p & <><>p
variants ...).
In fact on sigma_1, the subtleness of incompleteness, makes possible a
non trivial marriage between symmetry
p -> []<>p,
and antisymmetry
[]([](p->[]p)->p)->p.
Actually those logics (with p representing sigma_1 sentences) have
both the "trivial" axioms (false in most modal logics)
"p-> []p". It asserts the sigma_1 completeness of the universal
machine (with [] = the box in G = Gödel's beweisbar), together with
the "reflection" formula []p -> p.
They have p -> []p and [] -> p, but if "p->[]p" occurs at the G level,
[] p -> p is only verified at the G* level, and []<>p does not
collapse into p.
And S4Grz1 does not even lost the necessitation rule, having both []
([]p -> p) for p atomic, and [](p->p), but again []<>p does not
collapse, and still gives a non trivial quantization of the
arithmetical sigma_1 proposition.
I am a constructive mystic. I am telling you that truth, including the
physical truth, is in your head, and (the modern constructive part):
truth is in the head of all universal numbers. The Löbian number are
the one who have enough imagination (induction power) to get that point.
All entities capable of believing in the Peano axioms can get that
point. If patient and motivated enough, 'course.
That does not mean it is true, but it means that if, by the Church-
Turing comp necessity, you survive with a digital brain or body, well
in that case it is true (normally, if no invalid steps, etc.).
Bruno
(*) MC = Many Computations.
And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason
Theorem. I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI.
Comp like string theory is so rich in results that I suggest that
it could as well predict a single world.
I doubt this.
However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility,
Thanks.
a rare combination.
I hope it is not. Comp predicts it is not. The more you know, the
more you are aware of the bigness of what you don't know.
Bruno
Richard
On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM, <ghib...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote:
On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:
On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Turing *emulation* is only meaningful in the context of
emulating one part relative to another part that is not
emulated, i.e. is "real".
If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare
with nature.
When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and
some don't.
Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the
question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed
the question about what it means for something to exist.
So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not
falsified because it may be true somewhere else?
I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless "no
matter what comp predicts" is a slightly awkward, but
potentially rather funny, pun?)
But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it
isn't, which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable
at some level, or it isn't. And if it is, either there is some
flaw in what Bruno derives from that assumption, or there isn't.
But the question is about how to test comp. Bruno has offered
that we should compare its predictions to observed physics. My
view is that this requires predictions about what happens here
and now, where some things happen and some don't. "Predictions"
that something happens somewhere in the multiverse don't satisfy
my idea of testable.
But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white
noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views
on this, and the simplest pass from provability to probability
(the local erasing of the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization
of the arithmetical sigma_1 proposition. A good chance that
arithmetic provided some quantum erazing, or destructive
interference in the observations.
To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the
quantum theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so
for comp, as it needs to if comp is true.
My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in
peano Arithmetic, that concerns you.
It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem
in arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics.
I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum
propositional tautologies.
Bruno
So it looks like it isn't just me that doesn't understand your
story of testability.
So may I do a little test here. Can anyone here, other than
Bruno, explain this paragraph in terms of realizable falsiibility
and attest to that?
"By looking to our neighborhood close enough to see if the physics
match well a sum on infinities of computations. If comp is true, we
will learn nothing, and can't conclude that comp has been proved,
but
if there is a difference, then we can know that comp is refuted
(well,
comp + the classical theory of knowledge)."
How does the end part "well, comp + the classical theory of
knowledge" change the commitment to falsification?
Good question. I let other answer, but frankly, it is just a matter
of *studying* the papers. Note that in some presentation, I take
the classical theory (or definition) of knowledge granted, but in
other presentation, I explain and answer your question with some
detail, and it is the object of the thesis.
More on this, and you can ask the question to me. The point is in
focus, not the success of my pedagogy on this list.
Bruno
I think you're confused where your theory ends and scientific
standards, conventions, definitions begin. The arguments and
explanations you lay out in your theory, may certainly arrive at
various conclusions for the implications comp has for the world.
And I'm quite sure within that you offer your explanation for the
falsifiability of comp.
But you're getting ahead of yourself dramatically Bruno, if you
think the details of your argument is an influential factor in
settling the matter of falsifiability. What you profess within your
theory is irrelevant...on this encapsulating turf.
In fact from memory you've made about 4 arguments at various times.
In at least one of your papers you offer this...little package of
philosophical reasoning, which 5 lines and 30 seconds later
concludes your work is falsifiable so scientific. I mentioned at
the time the same argument can be formulated for all
philosophy...and probably religion and everything else. Then you
insisted your theory is falsifiable because its fundamental
position requires huge accomplishments, like deriving physics.
So I mentioned the same argument is applicable to any and all ToE,
by definition. Which is obviously true...but you reacted angrily,
apparently denying you ever constructed such an argument. It would
be very easy to guide you to where you said it...repeatedly...and
to my protests. Just as it would have been easy to demonstrate
multiple occasions on which you claimed computations are
intrinsically conscious, and the other events too. The reason I
haven't is intellectual respect and a wish to accept any
clarification or edit as the right version if you say it is.
I've gone out of my way to do this...but the plain data accumulated
now Bruno, is that you're confused what the meaning of
falsifiability actually is. Your angry rebuff concluded in making
me responsible for 'not getting it'....before yet another
'clarification' that your theory simply leaves 'no choice'...and
it's this property of contraining to block all paths but the one,
that delivers the scientific standard.
But you've moved past that in the few posts since, and now the
reason your theory is falsifiable is because we can look to the
local physicals, and compare that with taking a summation of an
infinite multiverse of possible computations. Apparently, if there
is a 'difference' comp is falsified. Well...not quite....comp +
classical natural law is falsified.
There is nothing - no part - of this formulation...or any of the
other more careful attempts that I have seen, that even begins to
exhibit the properties of testability. But what's really telling is
that you describe a sort of, process....a sequence of
steps.....apparently with a falsification as one possible outcome.
So...you define falsifiability as a process....a process within the
arguments of your theory. Each step of the process, your theory has
not even begun to approach actually resolving...or even the basic
thinking of what such a resolution would look like. A summation of
an infinity of multiverses of all possible computations? And who or
what decides when the infinite set is all accounted for? Could it
be we'll have to rely on the arguments within your theory for that?
Could it also be your theory currently has no better insight of
what it even means than I do...not that can be independently
verified or tested.
So let's recap Bruno...your theory will one day tell us what the
summation of infinities comes to....and presumably also the correct
formulation of the 'local neighbourhood' for a 1:1 comparison. So
your theory will - oneday - perform this calculation.....and so
your theory will assess the results....and then your theory will
announce whether it is falsified or not.
You can surely see that this is a self-referring mess. And do you
know why it's like this? It's because you are trying to define
falsifiability within your theory and tell the world a new
definition based on a process of far-future sequenced events.
Oh sure, I'm the only one that seems to care about this here in
this little goldfish bowl. People here....they like you....they
enjoy your theory.......appreciate what they perceive as your
patience and willingness to engage any person. Listen....I like
many of your qualities too. My intuition with the fullness of time,
is that you've seriously wasted my time by engaging with me about
the items important to me.....it's very clear at no time have you
been willing to re-evaluate your envisionings of falsification, and
confront the very obvious serious questions.
So you've wasted my time.......and fooled yourself the fact no one
else here in this tiny group feels any need to haul you over for
any claims you make.....and largely don't really care that much
about the old fashioned falsifiability thing......all rather passé
in the infinite infinities of infinities of everything infinitely
explained. Sorry...below the belt...no grievance and so on. So
anyway, they let you get away with murder Bruno, and you fool
yourself this is reflects the norm. My questions and concerns are
the norm mate.
I know you'll be coming back saying you don't know what I'm talking
about, and you'll restate your theory is testable...and you'll get
away with it because no one holds you to account for things like
this. But the lone position from me....and as it happens the vast
majority of serious scientists I should think, is that you don't
begin to understand the nature and distinctiveness of
falsifiability, so I'll leave you with a refresher:
1) A precise, non-trivial prediction is fundamental, that tells us
something NEW about physical law....that is to say, goes over and
above offering some new *explanation* of exactly what we already
know. This is the fundamental substance of testability, and
falsifiability.
This Bruno, you never accomplish. You never produce a single non-
trivial prediction from all your work. It does not count to say,
you predict your theory will do great things...it does not count to
then argue that if it doesn't do those great things that would be a
falsification. It does not add any value at all to exchange a
prediction for a process of far future steps. The theorist has no
say how his prediction is tested...he's as welcome as the next
person to make a helpful suggestion.....but the whole end to end
process of testing/observing, is complete outside the theory and
the whimsical arguments of the theorist. And this separation is
fundamental. This is what it's all about.
So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in
the scientific sense. No one calls you on this.....here.....but
then again.....let's face it no one answered my question either.
But other there....all you'll accomplish with this hubris is to be
ignored and written off. Which you probably are, by and large.
And...I wanted to add value for you....for my part I would actually
question the way your friends write you a pass about this, because
this is one tiny goldfish bowl dude.
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