On 19 May 2014, at 19:06, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/19/2014 2:38 AM, LizR wrote:
His main interest is the mind-body problem; and my interest in that
problem is more from an engineering viewpoint. What does it take
to make a conscious machine and what are the advantages or
disadvantages of doing so. Bruno says a machine that can learn and
do induction is conscious, which might be testable - but I
think it would fail. I think that might be necessary for
consciousness, but for a machine to appear conscious it must be
intelligent and it must be able to act so as to convince us that
it's intelligent.
That is fair enough, but it (of course) assumes primary materialism -
No it doesn't. Why do you think that? I think "assuming primary
materialism" is a largely imaginary fault Bruno accuses his critics
of. Sure physicists study physics and it's a reasonable working
hypothesis; but nobody tries to even define "primary matter" they
just look to see if another layer will be a better layer of physics
or not.
I agree. I often insist that physics does NOT assume primary matter in
any paper. And physicists are usually not much shocked by the comp
consequences. (They do have a problem with understanding Gödel's
theorem, alas).
But in the field of theology or metaphysics, physicalist does assume
primitive matter or primary physics.
With comp, I illustrate that, on that metaphysical or theological
plane, it just does not work.
We should not oppose physics and comp, only physicalism and comp. The
work is for people interested in the mind-body problem, or in
afterlife, or in the nature of the first person or the soul. Not in
physics, even if eventually the mind-body problem impacts physics at
its most fundamental level (as I show).
otherwise a conscious machine, as commonly understood, might have
other attributes that can't be deduced from its structure, and
hence the engineering approach will fail. (Hence to be fully
confident in this approach you should perhaps show what is wrong
with Bruno's starting assumptions, or his deductions.)
I'm assuming it doesn't and that I can make conscious machine from
any assemblage that can interact with the world in a certain way.
And I have shown what I think is wrong with Bruno's deductions. In
his MGA he relies on the MG being isolated, not part of a world - or
when challenged on the point he says it can be expanded to be as
large as the whole universe, i.e. to be a world. But I think it
makes a difference. I think the MG can only be conscious relative
to a world in which it can learn and act.
I can agree with this, and this is taken into account in the nuance of
[]p, either the one linking the machine to truth ([]p & p), or
consistency ([]p & <>t).
Bruno (being a logician and mathematician) thinks that consciousness
doesn't need any external referents.
I think nothing. I assume that there is a level where my brain/body
(in a generalized sense which can include anything Turing emulable and
needed for my consciousness to proceed locally) is Turing emulable.
I don't know if that is true, but I can show that IF that is true,
then physics (and the whole theology) is an emergent truth in the mind
of all universal löbian machines, and that emerges from elementary
arithmetic.
It's not a conclusive refutation, but a point of evidence is that
humans in sensory deprivation tanks tend to have their thoughts
enter a loop - which I would say shows that they need external
reference. I tend to agree with JKC that intelligence is harder
(and more important) than consciousness.
Not for solving the mind-body problem. What you seem to say is that
you are not really interested in the mind-body problem. No problem. In
french we say "il faut de tout pour faire un monde" (we need
everything to make a world).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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