On 19 May 2014, at 20:47, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
On Monday, May 19, 2014 7:40:35 PM UTC+1, ghi...@gmail.com wrote:
On Monday, May 19, 2014 6:24:45 PM UTC+1, telmo_menezes wrote:
On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 7:06 PM, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 5/19/2014 2:38 AM, LizR wrote:
His main interest is the mind-body problem; and my interest in that
problem is more from an engineering viewpoint. What does it take to
make a conscious machine and what are the advantages or
disadvantages of doing so. Bruno says a machine that can learn and
do induction is conscious, which might be testable - but I think it
would fail. I think that might be necessary for consciousness, but
for a machine to appear conscious it must be intelligent and it must
be able to act so as to convince us that it's intelligent.
That is fair enough, but it (of course) assumes primary materialism -
No it doesn't. Why do you think that? I think "assuming primary
materialism" is a largely imaginary fault Bruno accuses his critics
of. Sure physicists study physics and it's a reasonable working
hypothesis; but nobody tries to even define "primary matter" they
just look to see if another layer will be a better layer of physics
or not.
But I think Bruno's criticism is that physics->psychology is
assumed, and that the reversal hypothesis is rejected a priori. So
it's not just a matter of "another layer".
Well yes, but if Brent's illustration reflects the actual thinking,
Bruno's position is logically unviable. Because although physics--
>psychology is assumed..that word 'assumed' sits in a special case
tense. It means 'for practical purposes' and does not mean 'we know
what's fundamental and it's matter so we totally reject the
possibility maths or concepts or sexy fantasies are actually what's
fundamental'
So it's a resolvable situation. For Bruno to take his stance, it has
to be the case what Brent says is fundamentally wrong and a brutal
dogma of 'knowing what we can't know' grips science in iron fist.
I don't think anything like that stands up. All the major scientists
wont to nurse a public profile or top up the pension with a popular
science book are very clear on this matter.
k
Another major logical problem with this, I mentioned a while back in
an earlier thread. The whole position that matter is non-primary or
non-real or whatever, is effectively trivial and redundant UNLESS
and UNTIL that hypotheses produces major scientific developments.
I am not sure of that. things can be true or false a long time before
we can know. The existence of microbes was suggested and rejected
until the microscopes, but the absence of microscopes did not prevent
the microbes to exist before we could know.
Anyway, comp predicts that physics is a branch of physics, and I give
the means to derive it, and derive already the whole propositional
logic of the observable (and explain a bit of this on this list
despite it is technical, as it has to be).
Until then it has the value of "seed idea" simply because, it does
not tell us about something that is therefore different in physical
law as we find it.
Well, I hope it does not, because it would mean the current physics is
correct and is derivable from arithmetic confirming comp. But I doubt
that this is the case, and it should not be the case form all material
hypostases, given that we found 3 different quantum logics. It would
be very interesting to see how far they are different from nature, and
this asks only works, as this question is partially mathematical, and
partially experimental.
Therefore notionally we can accept the hypothesis but immediately
having done so, we have to put in place where physical law was until
just a moment ago, a proxy object with identical features. So it's
meaningless for just itself. It needs to produce or "hello proxy, or
are you the other one?"
Technically, we have already a proximity relation, and a complementary
orthogonality relation. We can test them in laboratory, but we can
also deduce the one from QM, so the testability of comp today is still
limited to compare with what we already infer from observation.
But physics fails on explaining where the physical laws come from, and
fails even more on consciousness. Comp does not: it provides an
explanation, and precise theories (indeed their propositional logics).
Bruno
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