On 10 Jul 2014, at 21:56, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/10/2014 12:19 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-07-10 20:39 GMT+02:00 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>:
On 7/10/2014 4:08 AM, David Nyman wrote:
In short, under physicalism, a 'computation' *just is* a
particular sequence of physical states. Indeed what else could it
be? The states, so to speak, come first and hence the notion that
those states 'implement a computation' is always an a posteriori
attribution that neither need, nor can, bring anything further to
the party.
I agree with all you wrote. But as Bruno says it's a reductio.
Given that it's absurd, the question is what makes it absurd. I
think it's the assumption that the sequence of physical states
constitutes a computation *independent* of any reference to a
world. When you talk about your PC and accidental compensation for
a physical fault, the concept of 'compensation' already assumes a
correct operation - but what makes an operation correct?...it's
relation to you and the rest of the world. A computation, a
sequence of states simpliciter, could be a computation of anything
or of nothing. So the intuition that the computation still exists
without the physical instantiation
But that's how we know a given physical instantiation is said to
compute this or that, it's because it has a one/one mapping to the
abstract computation... the computation is what relates the input
to the output... if we cannot relate a physical instantiation to
the abstract algorithm, in what way could we say it computes
anything ?
That's my point, we need the physical (a world) to impute meaning to
the computational process so that it is a computation.
We seem to agree that physics is necessary, but that is the whole
point of the UDA: physics is arithmetically necessary from the
observational point of view of the average (in some relative sense)
universal number. Physics is logically necessary = physics is
derivable from something already admitted as necessary (like
elementary arithmetic or any universal number).
Ontologically, we need nothing more, for example, than K and S and the
axioms Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz). Or, if you prefer, RA. (a very tiny
fragment of Arithmetic).
All we need are universal numbers capable of developing stable
relations. They provably exist in the theory above.
Then the simplest definition of knowledge (called the "standard one"
by Gerson and many philosophers) can justify how meaning appears, and
seems to be undefinable and non communicable by universal numbers in
between universal numbers. When universal numbers or combinators are
looking inward they are confronted to the []p / []p & p separation.
For ontological existence we need only the usual first order logical
meaning given by the existencial inference rule (p(k) / ExP(x)"
Physical or observational existence, with some variants, are then
defined (through UDA-AUDA) by something like
[]<>(Ex []<>P(x, a, b, c)),
with the box and diamond taken from the logic S4Grz1, or Z1*, or X1*,
P(x, a, b, c) is sigma_1.
Note that the physical existence, and the mathematical existence (here
just arithmetical) are well kept separated, like the psychological
(S4Grz) is separated from the ontic (G, G*)and the observational
(S4Grz1, Z1*; X1*).
Bruno
Brent
It's strange that all the program that run on any physical machine
are made of abstraction, you never program using electron... you
program at the basic level with boolean logic, that you can relate
to physical phenomenon, but never the other way around.
Quentin
is contradicted by the intuition that a computation must be about
something. With conflicting absurdities I'm left unconvinced.
Brent
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