On Fri, Aug 15, 2014 at 12:09:27PM +1200, LizR wrote: > On 15 August 2014 09:29, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > On 8/14/2014 11:40 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: > > > > Then it'd be no problem for you guys to clearly spell out what that > > environment is. > > > > Yes, that's a problem. The MGA considers a computational sequence that > > produces some conscious thought. I think that in order for the > > computational sequence to have meaning it must refer to some context in > > which decision or action is possible. That's what makes it about something > > and not just a sequence of events. I initially thought of it in terms of > > the extra states that had to be available for counterfactual correctness in > > response to an external environment, e.g. seeing something, having a K_40 > > atom decay in your brain. But now I've think the necessity of reference is > > different than counterfactual correctness. For example if you had a > > recording of the computations of an autonomous Mars Rover they wouldn't > > really constitute a computation because the recording would not have the > > possibility of branching in response to inputs. And the inputs wouldn't > > necessarily be external, at a different state of the Rover's learning the > > same sequence might have triggered a different association from memory. So > > the referents are not necessarily just external, they include all of memory > > as well. > > > > Given that comp assumes consciousness supervenes on classical computation, > it's still hard for me to imagine what the difference is that > counterfactuals or meaning supply. That is, a classical computation (as > opposed to a quantum one...perhaps???) is a well-defined set of steps, and > if you re-run them in the MGA they're identical. There may be no > possibility of reacting differently to different inputs, but I can't see > what difference - i.e. what real, physical, engineering (etc) type > difference that makes. If consciousness is digitally emulable, then it can > be replayed, and whatever "counterfactuals" and "meanings" that the > consciousness may attach to its internal states or (replayed) inputs will > be repeated. > > So in a nutshell I can't see how, assuming consciousness supervenes on > physical computation, that "being about something" or having "meaning" or > "needing counterfactual correctness" -- or needing a real environment, for > that matter, as opposed to identically repeated inputs -- can make any > difference to whether the UTM in question is conscious. Because a system > that interacts with an environment and one that replays that interaction > exactly are, or can in theory be made, physically identical. > > What am I missing? >
The consequence of assuming that counterfactuals make no difference in your supervenience thesis is that it implies consciousness supervenes on a recording. I constantly stumbled over this point too, as it is not adequately spelled out in typical formulations of the computational supervenience thesis. For some, that is a bridge too far. Maybe you could try following Bruno's "stroboscope argument" to see if that persuades. (Not sure if there's an English language version about, though). Where Brent and I differ from the usual interpretation is that we don't think counterfactuals are irrelevant to the physical supervenience thesis either. That is because the physical world is fundamentally quantum, and for all intents and purposes acts as a Multiverse, so the counterfactuals are just as physically real as the factuals. But the MGA does show a contradiction between the physical and computational supervenience thesis in a classical, low resource (aka non-robust) physical reality, and this suffices to handle the non-robust case of the UDA (aka step 8). Cheers -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
