On 8/15/2014 10:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Aug 2014, at 10:41, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Aug 14, 2014 at 10:25:40AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I agree with you in general, but I can agree a little bit with Liz
too, as I find Brent slightly sneaky on this issue, but all in all
Brent is rather polite and seems sincere. Yet his critics (of step
8) is not that clear. But then that is why we discuss. Anyone seeing
Brent's point can help to make it clearer.
His point is that he doesn't believe input free computations can be
conscious
But it is a most fundamental principle in computer science that you can always
internalize the input.
From the program Factorial, you can build (uniformly for all programs and inputs, for
any number of inputs) a program Factorial5 which on no input computes the factorial of 5.
But a program with the input internalized is no different than a recording. If you
proposed to internalized all possible inputs, then that means making what I referred to as
the environment part of the program.
Each night we do dreams, with input having been internalized, or are recreated to mimic
correct referent.
If the environment is needed, we might add it in the "generalized brain", that will not
invalidate the reasoning, as long as we keep comp (so that the environment is preserved
itself by a digital emulation at some level,
I agree, except that it does invalidate the assertion that psychology and physics have
been reversed. I'd say that they had been unified - both as aspects of the UD computation.
if that is not the case, we go out of the scope of our working hypothesis.
- there must always be some referrent to the environment
(which is noisy, counterfactual, etc). If so, it prevents the MGA, and
Maudlin's argument, from working.
I guess for Brent that even dream states still have some referrent to
the environment, even if it be some sort of random synaptic noise.
In all case the referents can be internalized, even the infinite streams, on which the
UD dovetails.
From the first person view, they cannot, the domain of indeterminacy seems to be at
least 2^aleph_0. We need a topology (provided by G, S4Grz, ..) and a proximity space
(also provided by those logics, on p sigma_1). The first person is by defaut connected
to a random oracle, which is the FPI on all its emulation in the sigma_1 arithmetic.
Brent seems to assume those "physical environment" (what are there, really?)
A good question. Do you have a good answer?
to abort an explanation of the origin of their appearance and their relative stability
from simpler principles,
like Kxy = x, and Sxyz = xz(yz).
Brent tries valiantly to resist the charm of computationalism :)
But I have not seen this explanation - only assertions that there must be one - "assuming
comp".
It is a different theology. Instead of a creation, with or without a creator, we have a
universal dreamer losing itself again and again in an infinite web of dreams, and it
looks structured like in Plotinus, so a sort of Abramanic god is not excluded, like an
*apparent* stable aristotelian matter is not excluded. We are at the beginning, so of
course, there are not much things we can exclude from that theology, except a classical
boolean matter or any institutionalization of the unnameable. That excludes proselytism
for example, but comp excludes all public pretension or claim to truth in general.
Yet it depends on there being unprovable truths.
Brent
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