Just to get back to the topic for a moment. Do I read correctly that the difference between Russell and Bruno lies in whether a "raw", in Bruno's usage, computation in terms of UD* is "actualized" (vs. what precisely? A kind of "emanating non-raw" computation? This is a bit fuzzy from my pov)?
Also, Russell's point of view would be appreciated, as is his input/efforts in general + this thread, and his paper that presents clearly and accessibly MGA, are, which hopefully goes without saying. Respects and complements, regardless of these quibbles. If you have no time, Russell; no worries, just minor concern to continue the exchange. Cue the military march music of stoicism, with hyper grave quality: We can never get to the bottom of these things.. nor would we wish to! Who says "it's at the bottom" anyway? Maybe "it's upstairs". My fridge certainly, truly, UD* or some alternate weirdness approved, just* is upstairs*. The fridge is true. And so is a slice of cheese. And yes, I kid. :-) PGC On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 2:27 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > On 8/19/2014 4:44 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 20 August 2014 04:16, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> >> If your altered state of consciousness has no self-awareness, is it >> still "consciousness"? And there's self-consciousness, i.e. being aware >> you are thinking. So it's not 'fading' qualia, it different categories of >> consciousness. I'd say my dog has self-awareness, e.g. he knows his name. >> But I'm not so sure he is self-conscious. The koi in my pond are aware, but >> I doubt they are self-aware. >> > > So this is all that Brent means by degrees of consciousness, > > > No, there might also be other differences, although Bruno would no doubt > disagree. Consider my example of the autonomous Mars Rover, suppose that > instead of summarizing things into a narrative memory and then > reconstructing remembered events, as people seem to, it simply recorded > everything and played back segments when it remembered. ISTM this might > make a difference in kind. Or suppose there were many Mars Rover at > different locations and were controlled by the same program. They would > have different kind of sense of location. > > > after all the waving it in everyone's faces as though it had huge > explanatory power, it's now been reduced to whether or not an organism > knows certain things about itself. This looks to me like a lot of > backpedalling on what started out as a rather grandiose concept, > > > Why would different kinds of consciousness be a grandiose concept? > > > but which has now ended up as something fairly trivial. So koi carp > don't have a concept of self (who would have thought it? What fools you've > been in the all-or-nothing camp not to realise that!) > > But it now appears that Brent just stepped out of the "consciousness > continuum" camp (from thermostats, according to Dan Dennet, to us) and into > the "either-conscious-or-not" camp. Is someone going to welcome him? > > > Bruno thinks there's a good chance the algae in my pond is conscious, so > he probably agrees that my thermostat might be too. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
