On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 6:16 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 8/19/2014 8:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> On 18 Aug 2014, at 09:56, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On 18 August 2014 15:20, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>> >>>> On 8/17/2014 8:49 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>> >>> Both consciousness and physics supervene on the computations, which >>>>> exist >>>>> necessarily. Consciousness does not supervene on the physics. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, I agreed to that. The question was can consciousness supervene on >>>>> computations that do not instantiate any physics? I think not. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I think that a sustained stream of consciousness will probably be part >>>> of a >>>> computation that instantiates physics - instantiates a whole universe >>>> complete with physics. >>>> >>>> >>>> That's answering the converse question. So if the early universe was >>>> instantiated by a computation (a computation that instantiated physics) >>>> then >>>> you think that part of the early universe was a sustained stream of >>>> consciousness. How do you conceive of this consciousness' relation to >>>> the >>>> physics? For example might it be some structure in the inflaton >>>> field? Or >>>> do you think of it as separate from physical structures? >>>> >>> >>> I think of consciousness as a side-effect of, at least, the >>> computations that give rise to the type of behaviour we observe in >>> intelligently-behaving entities. It could also be that much simpler >>> computations have a much simpler consciousness, i.e. panpsychism, but >>> I don't know how to prove this; it's hard enough to prove that even >>> other people are conscious. >>> >>> However, the point that I wanted to make was that if computation can >>>> instantiate consciousness then there is nothing to stop a recording, a >>>> Boltzmann Brain, a rock and so on from doing so; for these possibilities >>>> have been used as arguments against computationalism or to arbitrarily >>>> restrict computationalism. >>>> >>>> >>>> Why is it arbitrary to say that a computation that is very simple, has >>>> not >>>> possible branchings for example, cannot be conscious while some more >>>> complex >>>> computation, one controlling an autonomous Mars Rover for example, may >>>> be? >>>> >>> >>> What is arbitrary is to say that a computer that has unused components >>> inactivated, as per Maudlin or Bruno's MGA, is unconscious or >>> differently conscious. >>> >>> Do you agree with Bruno that consciousness is all-or-nothing? >>>> >>> >>> No, I think there are different degrees of consciousness. >>> >> >> Unless we have a vocabulary problem, this seems to contradict your fading >> qualia argument. If you allow degrees of consciousness, it becomes unclear >> why we can't have partial zombie. The guy would still say "I don't feel any >> change", but actually would be less and less conscious, just unconsciously >> so. >> >> When I say that consciousness is all-or-nothing, I just mean that either >> someone is conscious, or is not. It does not mean that there are no >> consciousness state which looks like, when we come back from them, as being >> slightly conscious. Those are only special altered state of consciousness. >> > > If your altered state of consciousness has no self-awareness, is it still > "consciousness"? And there's self-consciousness, i.e. being aware you are > thinking. So it's not 'fading' qualia, it different categories of > consciousness. I'd say my dog has self-awareness, e.g. he knows his name. > But I'm not so sure he is self-conscious. The koi in my pond are aware, but > I doubt they are self-aware. > If one assumes that physics is not Turing emulable, due to a sort of random FPI selection property, where it thus becomes measure on infinities of computations, then I don't see a problem to reason "consciousness is perhaps closer in kinship to truth/reality than to some Turing emulable structure". This would be another type of "brute fact", even though on the surface, it would seem that comp implies consciousness to be something Turing emulable (gotta watch out...). So, with this line of argument, in basic existential sense, consciousness just is there or it isn't. When I used "degrees" earlier in the thread, I was thinking altered states, that suggest that capacity of self-reference and amnesia relative to some normal level (e.g. "I am really drunk, not just tipsy"), is computable, so there appears to be more/less. Perhaps because the machine level of description IS amenable to influence by quantifiable things, like dosage of foods and chemicals. But I guess this would boil down to some phenomenological 1p view. It's tricky because consciousness pastes the machine to truth, so there is a lot of potential for talking nonsense here... PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
