Hi Richard,
> In my papers I have conjectured that consciousness is a BEC effect because > apparently in a BEC of particles, for all these particles to act as one, > each particle must be aware of all others or at least its nearest > neighbors. If so, for consciousness to also be a computation, then BECs > must be computable, and I wonder if that is true. But again, if so, then > BEC computation selects the types of computations necessary for > consciousness. > I'm afraid I am too physically illiterate here, but could you elaborate on how the particles act as one? Am I correct in assuming that they have certain degrees of freedom, but all behave the same without any further causality? > But I must admit I have been too lazy to pursue this possibility in > earnest. Rather nowadays I spend most of the day following free-range baby > chicks around. I find it interesting that I can watch them closely but > cannot touch them, just like in the human species. > Chicks are tricky, no matter the species :) Telmo. > Richard > > On Fri, Sep 19, 2014 at 4:42 AM, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> > wrote: > >> >> >> On Fri, Sep 19, 2014 at 2:03 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >>> On 9/18/2014 4:20 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>> >>> > We have no way to measure or detect consciousness, >>>>> >>>> >>>> That certainly isn't true in my case, there is one particular >>>> consciousness that I'm very very good at detecting, and although I can't >>>> prove it I have a hunch there is one consciousness you can detect too. >>>> >>> >>> Right, but you can't propose an experiment that tests the claim that >>> you are conscious or that I am conscious to a third party. >>> >>> >>> I don't know what you do for a living, Telmo, but I sure hope you're not >>> an anesthesiologist. >>> >> >> I'm not, but I'm glad they exist. >> >> Anaesthesia seems to shut down the brain's ability to perceive the >> environment and to form memories. I have no contention with that. I also >> have no contention with most of modern science, including (the still very >> crude) field of neuroscience. I am sure the brain is an asynchronous >> computer, that intelligence is a property of this computer and so on. >> >> The trouble is that none of this seems to explain how consciousness >> originates. Maybe it's a still unknown property of matter. Maybe matter >> itself is a dream of computations, like Bruno suggests. The point is, we >> have no reason to prefer one explanation over the other, they both fit the >> facts. >> >> What disturbs me the most is our growing inability to say "I don't know". >> I think I know where this comes from. Science has been under attack by >> several brands of dark ages fundamentalism, so scientists react by becoming >> more militant. This is a mistake. "Beware that, when fighting monsters..." >> >> Telmo. >> >> >>> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
