On 24 Sep 2014, at 04:05, meekerdb wrote:

On 9/23/2014 1:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

This is isn't necessarily wrong, but as an argument it leaves a big gap.

You might elaborate. There is an unavoidable gap about consciousness, but if you accept the definition and computationalism, the gap is entirely explained, indeed by the G* minus G non-empty annulus and its intensional variants. But may be you allude to some other gap, in which case I would be happy to make it more precise.

I don't refer to the unavoidable gap, but to the gap between having an inner narrative and being able to do universal computation.

Universal or sub-universal, if you want the detail.

It should not be a too much difficult exercise to prove that once you have a universal system, it has an inner narrative, that is a 3p self. It would be the code of the universal machine in question, written in the language of the machine. It is the arithmetical Gödel predicate "[]", that is one for each machine RA, PA, ZF, etc. You can define them all already in arithmetic, of course RA, PA, ZF will increasingly prove more things about them.

Now, having an inner narrative does not implies Turing universality, per se. But what Turing universal systems prove is already very weak, like RA, so it is a good place to start. Löbianity, the hypostases and the points of view needs PA and its induction axioms.






 I don't see entailment in either direction.

Universality entails existence of inner narrative(s) (even at the right level, also at other levels, some correct, some not, etc. + the points of view). It take the correct one, by construction (I interview PA on PA). Then I handle the nuance of "I" coming from the discrepancies between the points of view ([]p, []p & p, []p & <>p, []p & <>p & p).

Existence of inner narrative(s) does not implies Universality, nor sub- universality. The mathematical amoeba (D"D") is not Turing universal, like I think is the "real amoeba" or its genomes.

Bruno



Brent

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