On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 1:25 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> > On 19 Nov 2014, at 18:41, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > > > On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 12:17 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> On 19 Nov 2014, at 17:06, Richard Ruquist wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 6:40 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 18 Nov 2014, at 18:34, John Clark wrote: >>> >>> On Mon, Nov 17, 2014 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >>> >>> >> Maybe Schrodinger's Wave Equation doesn't interfere either, only >>>>> other worlds do, >>>>> >>>> >>>> > ? >>>> >>> ! >>> >>> >> and maybe the wave equation is just a way, and certainly not the only >>>>> way, humans have of describing that interference between worlds. >>>>> >>>> >>>> > Indeed, >>>> >>> >>> Then why the "?" ? >>> >>> >>> Probably because I did not parse well the sentence above, and the term >>> "world" is a but fuzzy in this context. But I guess we are OK. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> > You know positivist physicians still alive? Who? >>>> >>> >>> Every physicist alive uses both Heisenberg's Matrices and Schrodinger's >>> Wave; >>> >>> >>> OK, and other pictures and formulations of QM too. >>> >>> >>> >>> none use Positivism or any other school of philosophy because no >>> philosophical franchise is of the slightest help in doing what scientists >>> want to do, figure out how the world works. >>> >>> >>> I disagree. The collapse axiom, which is still in amost textbook, and >>> which is used by bad pedagog to avoid hard question, is a philosophical >>> axiom relying on a religious belief: the belief that there is only one >>> physical universe, and that we are unique. >>> >> >> The collapse hypothesis is correct if we need to conserve the total >> energy and information in the universe. >> >> >> From quasi zero information, you can generate without adding any >> information, all informations. Just split an observer and put them in front >> of 1 or 0, and repeat. Similarly, the MW (quantum) view of the vacuum >> generates all the physically consistent possibilities, without spending one >> bit. The collapse seems on the contrary to generate bit from nothing. But >> the collapse is only in the eye of the partial subsystem, as we can read of >> (the diaries) of the observer in the terms of the waves (this in any base). >> I suspect it is like that for energy too. >> > > > Since MWI is deterministic, all possibilities that can possibly ever > happen can be known ahead of time and stored in a 4 dimensional space for > each universe. The actual physical space is recorded and embedded as causal > lines in the 4D mathematical space. Quantum mechanic random selections > during energy-conserving wave collapse make those lines fuzzy, but > distinct, for the most part. > > > The problem is that I cannot even understand what is the collapse, doubly > so in the relativistic context, and it seems to me that it uses a lot of > energy, because it erases a lot of information. > Wave collapse only conserves energy if the energy and its information can be moved almost instantly from quantum state to quantum state. All of the available energy is required say in the double slit experiment to put the original photon back together. I have suggested that if wave functions act like BECs, then BECs may be the basis a valid wave-collapse 'mechanizm'. Richard > > I have not yet seen a theory of collapse which makes sense. It is like > saying that when an observer look a particle, suddenly QM get wrong, when > QM explains exactly what happens, and why the observers will believe at > first sight to collapse a wave. > > (and then my point is that if we use computationalism in that reasoning, > as Everett did, we have to justify the wave itself, from a refinement of > the relation between machine and their mind). We must explain why an > universal unitary transformation (rotation) win the measure game at the > bottom. We need the equivalent of Gleason theorem for some classes of > number relation. I am open to the idea that string theory can give clues, > but then the Monster munshine itself must be explained in term of the > material hypostases. Theoretical Physics looks too much already to Number > Theory, but with computationalism, you can see that this again masks the > role of consciousness, which is the ultimate projector, the one which > differentiates and believe in collapse. The fire in the equation are > explained by the personal memories, especially those who are not > communicable by the subject (the qualia). > > Bruno > > > > > > Richard > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> Richard >> >> >>> >>> Some physicists used it as a rule of thumb, and as a way to not do >>> philosophy, but of course, that is eventually like a use of God-gap type of >>> explanation. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> > In math and physics, it is frequent that two apparantly different >>>> theories are equivalent, >>>> >>> >>> Yes, just like Heisenberg's Matrices and Schrodinger's Wave, they both >>> tell a story with a identical plot they just use different symbols in the >>> vocabulary of mathematics to do so, just as 2 books about World War 2 tell >>> the same story but use different symbols in the vocabulary of the English >>> language to do it; however neither book about World War 2, no matter how >>> good, is World War 2. I said it before but it's worth repeating, maybe we >>> should take seriously and think through the implications of what >>> mathematicians have been saying for years, mathematics is a language. >>> >>> >>> Mathematics use a mathematical language, but is not a language itself. >>> You can use different language to describe a similar mathematical reality. >>> You can use the combinators, or the sets, to *represent* the natural >>> numbers, and admit quite different axioms, but you will get the same facts, >>> for example that the number of ways to write an odd natural number as a sum >>> of four square is given by 24 times the sum of its odd divisor. Like the >>> product scalar does not depend of the orthonormal base, in linear algebra, >>> the truth of the arithmetical statements do not depend on the theory and >>> language used to describe them. It is the same for computer science, which >>> is actually a branch of number theory. Some machines will stop on some >>> input independently of the language used to describe those machines and >>> input. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> > but that does not make the thing described into a convention or >>>> language. >>>> >>> >>> True. A electron is not a convention or a language, but what about a >>> description of the electron written in a particular dialect of the language >>> of mathematics, like the Schrodinger Wave Equation? Yes Schrodinger's >>> Equation does a good job describing the behavior of a electron, but Dirac's >>> Equation does better, and Feynman's sum over histories even better. And >>> some equations do a terrible job describing the electron even though the >>> are grammatically correct sentences in the language of mathematics, that is >>> to say they are logically self consistent. So maybe you can not only write >>> true descriptions of the electron in the language of mathematics maybe you >>> can also write the equivalent of a Harry Potter novel in the language of >>> mathematics. Maybe Cantor's infinities and the Real Numbers are >>> mathematical Harry Potter novels. Actually I kinda doubt it but maybe. >>> >>> >>> Sure. but may be electron are only useful fiction to get the voltage >>> right for the working of my fridge. Here math and physics are alike, and it >>> asks some familiarity with the subject to develop an intuition of what >>> might be conventional and what might be a deep truth independent of the >>> subject. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> > On the contrary, it points on something real beyond the language. >>>> >>> >>> But that's exactly what I was getting at, maybe it points to something >>> real beyond the mathematics. >>> >>> >>> I was meaning "it points on something real and mathematical beyond the >>> language. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> I don't insist that is true, maybe mathematics is more than just a >>> language, but maybe not, I believe it's worth thinking about. Unlike >>> philosophers who are always certain but seldom correct I just don't know. >>> >>> >>> The choice of a theory might be conventional, but some truth will not >>> depend on that choice. And with computationalism, I explain that even >>> physics is "theory independent". You can use the axiom of arithmetic, or >>> the axiom on combinators, and the existence of 24, or of electron, will not >>> depend on it. A bit like most truth in linear algebra don't depend on the >>> choice of the base. >>> >>> It is not a convention that 17 is prime. It really means that you cannot >>> divide 17 to make some rectangle from it. If math was conventional, there >>> would not be any conjecture, like the Riemann hypothesis, or the twin prime >>> conjecture. Then Gödel's theorem justifies that the arithmetical truth is >>> beyond all possible theoretical formalization of it, and this, imo, gives >>> grain to realism in math, against conventionalism. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> John K Clark >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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