On 4 February 2015 at 19:47, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: On 2/4/2015 9:02 AM, David Nyman wrote: > > > On 4 February 2015 at 05:11, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> > As I understand it, being an epiphenomenon means one can give a causal >> > account of the phenomenon without mentioning it. But the epiphenomenon >> > necessarily accompanies the phenomenon. In the case of consciousness >> it's >> > essentially denying the possibility of a philosophical zombie. >> >> Yes, that's how I would put it. > > > Trouble is, that's saying both too much and not enough. If one can give a > causal account of a phenomenon without mentioning the epiphenomenon then it > would seem that the latter has significance only under extrinsic > interpretation (i.e. from the perspective of some interested agent). > > > Exactly. I has significance for the person whose experience in the > epiphenomenon. It's an intrinsic "interpretation". >
Well yes, some sort of intrinsic interpretation would seem the only viable alternative to the otherwise unavoidable requirement for extrinsic interpretation. But such a radical proposal requires an equally radical explication, to say the least. Otherwise the puzzlingly mutual reference between 'internal' and 'external' domains remains completely unexplained. For example, as Jason puts it, if consciousness is merely a causally-powerless epiphenomenon what is the external cause of our referring to it? > > IOW, it would seem merely to be a term of convenience, > > > No. Because it has subjective significance does not imply it is "merely a > term of convenience", subjective significance is still significance (in a > sense it's the basic kind of significance). > I think you misunderstand me. By 'term of convenience' I don't mean to imply insignificance, for the very reason you cite. I mean only that such levels of description are presumed to be inessential or redundant in explaining the action of the underlying reductive ontology. > > in the same sense that the economy is a term of convenience for an > extrinsic interpretation of the net action of the constituent parts. > Consequently to say that it "necessarily accompanies the phenomenon" would > appear be true in only a quite trivial sense. > > What you're saying amounts to the claim that something that apparently > has significance only under extrinsic interpretation is actually (and > necessarily) the agent of its own parallel but *intrinsic* interpretation. > Now the odd thing is that this kind of 'necessitation' can actually make > sense, as Bruno suggests, but only under specific a priori assumptions. > Under those assumptions, consciousness is indeed just such an 'intrinsic > interpretation' that transcends (or 'emerges from') a neutral third-person > ontological base in virtue of its > > > What does "its" refer to? If if has analytical truth "it" must be a > tautological proposition? > Yes, precisely. The tripartite relation of computation, belief and truth in this schema is indeed conceived as constitutive, or analytic. That's what makes the three components conceptually inseparable and hence incorrigible. Comp, as Bruno likes to say, can be understood as a theory of dreaming machines. However bizarre (or more probably, it is to be hoped, normal) these dreams, they must be incorrigibly as they appear, at least to a first approximation. David > Brent > > analytical truth with respect to an explicit epistemology. Hence it > would necessarily be the case (on those assumptions) that epistemology and > ontology be inseparable. On this basis, the notion of p-zombies would be > frankly inconsistent. > > David > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
