On 2/5/2015 4:41 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 5 February 2015 at 21:42, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
This looks like dualism in name only to me. The "mental" is just a
different model
of the same process modeled physically. Just as thermodynamics is
different model
for statistical mechanics.
But you're not describing epiphenomenalism here. AFAICS this is either eliminativism
(i.e. the "mental" as a category is simply a re-description of the physical) or some
other species of identity theory. I confess I've never been able to make sense of this,
but in any case there's no dualism because in the final analysis everything is supposed
to be 'just physical'.
You can't make sense of it because you insist making assumptions about it that you don't
like. It's not dualism because there's only one thing - whatever you call it.
If that were all there were to epiphenomenalism there would be no point in
distinguishing it from these positions.
What does "these" refer to? eliminativism? identity theory (whatever that is)?
But in fact epiphenomenalism differentiates two distinct phenomena, only one of which is
physical. The 'epi' signifies causal impotence, not categorical elimination.
You seem intent on defining terms in order to dimiss them. For example, why is taking
"mental" to be re-description of the physical "elimininativism"? Does it eliminate the
physical or the mental - or neither. If I describe heat as the average energy per degree
of freedom do you think I've eliminated heat? You seem to have a reflex so that any
mention of something physical triggers a response that the mental is being denied,
eliminated, and not properly honored and that someone is claiming "everything is just
physical" - even though it's been noted that "physical" is not very well defined.
Essentially the question seems to boil down, "Can there be an account of sequences of
thoughts that can be shared?" We all know there are explanations in terms of prior ideas,
memories, desires. Why should there not also be explanations of the same thing in terms
of neurons, hormones, and senses?
Brent
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