On 23 Feb 2015, at 00:32, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 3:17 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 2/22/2015 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Feb 2015, at 02:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/20/2015 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
QM + collapse is inconsistent (with a great variety of
principle, like computationalism, God does not play dice, no
spooky actions, etc.).
Principles of Platonist faith.
You don't need any faith to disbelieve in the opportunity to
invoke magical thing in the explanation.
It is up to those who make extraordinary claims to provide the
evidences.
Computationalism is an extraordinary claim.
For it to be extraordinary, it would have to be beyond ordinary.
However computationalism isn't just ordinary but its the majority
opinion among philosophers of mind.
Not as Bruno uses it: That all computations exist Platonically and
instantiate all possible thoughts - and a lot of other stuff.
Brent! You are doing the philosopher's trick. You attribute to me a
piece of philosophical vague opinion, so that you can make a critic.
Where in the reasoning do I ever use the idea that computations exists
Platonically, and what would that mean? I use only that computations
exists, and indeed all of them, in the same sense that "prime number
exists". Computation are just true relation existing among certain
numbers. They do instantiate all possible thought by the "yes doctor",
unless you introduce a non Turing emulable matter to enact
consciousness, but then, it is up to you to explain what is the role
of that matter, and how could a universal Turing machine makes the
difference.
As Liz said, the other stuff are deduced, not assumed.
That some things may happen at random isn't.
If random events were so common, why has no scientist ever detected
a conclusively objectively random phenomenon?
How do you know that? Has any scientist ever detected anything
"conclusively and objectively". There are a lot of scientist who
have studied the statistics to quantum phenomena to see if they
agree with the Born rule - and so far they do.
Why is every phenomenon among all theories in physics is
deterministic
If they aren't we call them "geography" or "symmetry breaking".
(with the notable exception of wave-function collapse (which
Everett showed can be explained as a deterministic phenomenon
without having to assume it as a separate postulate/phenomenon
beyond the deterministic, linear and reversible equations of QM))?
Except that you do have to assume a separate postulate. Either you
assume the Born rule assigns probabilities, or you must assume
infinitely many parallel worlds and show somehow that branch
counting recovers the Born rule.
By using implicitly the comp FPI, Everett extracts the Born rule in
the memory of the observers, and this in *any* base. This has been
seen by other author before Everett, like Paulette Destouche-Février.
Preskill makes that clear in his course on QC. Selesnick makes a short
account in his book(*) which is rather clear (not completely rigorous
to avoid complex integration). He attributes the long and rigorous
result to Finkelstein. I am still searching that work by Finkelstein
(but it is not among my most urgent duties ...).
Bruno
(*) S.A. Selesnick, Quanta, Logic and Space-Time, World Scientific 1998.
Brent
It is a theorem of comp, also. The many worlds, in his relative
state formulation, is already a consequence of
computationalism. By church thesis, *all* computations are
emulated in all possible ways in elementary arithmetic, with a
typical machine-independent redundancy: it makes the notion of
"world" formulable,
Does it? What's the definition of a world in comp?
It is a model of "my beliefs", assuming I am consistent (so that
such a model exist).
That would comport with quantum bayesianism.
You can handle the world by notion like maximal consistent sets of
formula, which in this case can have oracle like answering W or M
when opening a door after a self-duplication. A world can satisfy
a belief like "I belief in PA and I am currently located at
Washington".
But those are just words. Does Washington have to exist in a
world? Or just propositions containing "Washington". Without some
referents every two propositions not of the form "X and not-X" will
be consistent. "I'm in Washington." and "I'm in Moscow." are
consistent unless we have a theory of existence in spacetime and
some referents for "Washington" and "Moscow".
It looks like you prefer "many words" over "many worlds":
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9709032
It is argued that since all the above-mentioned approaches to
nonrelativistic quantum mechanics give identical cookbook
prescriptions for how to calculate things in practice, practical-
minded experimentalists, who have traditionally adopted the ``shut-
up-and-calculate interpretation'', typically show little interest
in whether cozy classical concepts are in fact real in some
untestable metaphysical sense or merely the way we subjectively
perceive a mathematically simpler world where the Schrodinger
equation describes everything - and that they are therefore
becoming less bothered by a profusion of worlds than by a profusion
of words.
Jason
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