On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:38, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 5:32 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 3:17 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 2/22/2015 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Feb 2015, at 02:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/20/2015 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
QM + collapse is inconsistent (with a great variety of
principle, like computationalism, God does not play dice, no
spooky actions, etc.).
Principles of Platonist faith.
You don't need any faith to disbelieve in the opportunity to
invoke magical thing in the explanation.
It is up to those who make extraordinary claims to provide the
evidences.
Computationalism is an extraordinary claim.
For it to be extraordinary, it would have to be beyond ordinary.
However computationalism isn't just ordinary but its the majority
opinion among philosophers of mind.
Not as Bruno uses it: That all computations exist Platonically and
instantiate all possible thoughts - and a lot of other stuff.
That's arithmetical realism, not computationalism. However, to
believe in the notion of Turing machines or Turing emulability
requires assuming at least something like the peano axioms.
Yes. Even less. RA can prove already all sigma_1 truth, and emulate
all computable processes. RA is just dumb about generalization. It
cannot prove x+y = y+x, nor even that all x are different from s(x).
So RA (= PA without the induction axioms) can already believe in
universal machine, but cannot prove a lot about them, nor about
themselves.
That some things may happen at random isn't.
If random events were so common, why has no scientist ever detected
a conclusively objectively random phenomenon?
How do you know that? Has any scientist ever detected anything
"conclusively and objectively".
Because if they did it would overturn some physical theory and be
big news, because so far all successful physical theories have been
deterministic.
There are a lot of scientist who have studied the statistics to
quantum phenomena to see if they agree with the Born rule - and so
far they do.
The usefulness or applicability of statistics doesn't imply
objective randomness.
Why is every phenomenon among all theories in physics is
deterministic
If they aren't we call them "geography" or "symmetry breaking".
(with the notable exception of wave-function collapse (which
Everett showed can be explained as a deterministic phenomenon
without having to assume it as a separate postulate/phenomenon
beyond the deterministic, linear and reversible equations of QM))?
Except that you do have to assume a separate postulate. Either you
assume the Born rule assigns probabilities, or you must assume
infinitely many parallel worlds and show somehow that branch
counting recovers the Born rule.
It remains to be seen whether a separate postulate is required or if
the Born rule can be derived from the existing postulates.
I guess that computationalism, or some variants, is needed.
Bruno
Jason
It is a theorem of comp, also. The many worlds, in his relative
state formulation, is already a consequence of
computationalism. By church thesis, *all* computations are
emulated in all possible ways in elementary arithmetic, with a
typical machine-independent redundancy: it makes the notion of
"world" formulable,
Does it? What's the definition of a world in comp?
It is a model of "my beliefs", assuming I am consistent (so that
such a model exist).
That would comport with quantum bayesianism.
You can handle the world by notion like maximal consistent sets of
formula, which in this case can have oracle like answering W or M
when opening a door after a self-duplication. A world can satisfy
a belief like "I belief in PA and I am currently located at
Washington".
But those are just words. Does Washington have to exist in a
world? Or just propositions containing "Washington". Without some
referents every two propositions not of the form "X and not-X" will
be consistent. "I'm in Washington." and "I'm in Moscow." are
consistent unless we have a theory of existence in spacetime and
some referents for "Washington" and "Moscow".
It looks like you prefer "many words" over "many worlds":
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9709032
It is argued that since all the above-mentioned approaches to
nonrelativistic quantum mechanics give identical cookbook
prescriptions for how to calculate things in practice, practical-
minded experimentalists, who have traditionally adopted the ``shut-
up-and-calculate interpretation'', typically show little interest
in whether cozy classical concepts are in fact real in some
untestable metaphysical sense or merely the way we subjectively
perceive a mathematically simpler world where the Schrodinger
equation describes everything - and that they are therefore
becoming less bothered by a profusion of worlds than by a profusion
of words.
Jason
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