On 27 Feb 2015, at 05:17, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 9:51 PM, meekerdb <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]
>> wrote:
On 2/26/2015 7:10 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
So then the mystery of the Born rule is solved. I don't see
why/how adding collapse solves anything.
I[t] adds that one of the probable states happens. MWI fails to
add that.
Isn't it enough when one considers the FPI (which tells us you will
only experience one of the probable states)?
FPI has been around a long time. In the earlier literature on the
Anthropic Principle it was known as self-selection.
FPI is different from anthropic self-selection. That was the point of
an old long debate between absolute and relative self-sampling (search
for ASSA and RSSA in the archive if interested).
The probabilities are bayesian, absolute, and a posteriori with self-
selection. The probabilities are non bayesian, relative and a priori.
The bayesian are useful to explain contingent features, like this or
that geographical reality (if we have heavy atoms, there are some
heavy atom makers in the neighborhood, indeed stars). In Everett QM,
and with computationalism, the FPI are not bayesian, but reflect as
usual the ignorance of the observer about which different computations
he will live or is living.
The problem is that any such principle applied to QM assumes what
has yet to be proved -- namely that anything that can be considered
a "self" or "1p" to be indeterminate about.
Self is not a 1p. Indeed there is a 3p self, which is the subject of
the theory of self-reference (the modal logic G is about that 3p-
self). The 1p self is a different matter. It is the knower. IN UD, and
in Everett, we can consider it as equivalent with the owner of the
(orthogonal, distinct) memories. In the mathematical treatment we can
apply the theaetetus' definition on the 3p self.
We don't have to assume them: they exists provably from the mechanist
assumption.
The 3p self is the representation of your body and beliefs. The 1p-
self is the knower, or the conscious owner of your private memories.
The 3p self admits 3p-representation, the 1p-self of the machine
provably (by the machine) doesn't admit any 3p-representation
available to the machine.
The formalism merely says that an initial state evolves into a
superposition -- nothing is selected as a "person" in that
superposition that could self-select, or be an indeterminate
individual.
?
Do you agree with the step 3 of UDA? (http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
)
It is hard to figure out what you mean here.
MWI does not lead to a useful notion of probability that can be
used, via the Born rule, to infer that interference terms are not
important.
?
Indeed, but that is a point in favor of the MWI: the interference
terms are important. On the contrary, once you have a collapse, you
lose the interference terms, and this makes quantum erasing more
problematical. With the MWI, quantum erasing is entirely explained,
using no more than the mechanist account of amnesia.
Bruno
Bruce
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