On 3/23/2015 10:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Mar 24, 2015 at 02:17:40PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
If you take the block universe model seriously then we are nothing
more than conscious recordings!
Fair point!
I don't know what MGA stands for, or what it means, so I can't
comment on that.
Ha - it's in the title of this thread!
I can enter a thread without knowing what the title means!
It's Bruno Marchal's "Movie Graph Argument" (I would probably have
translated it as "Filmed Graph Argument", but MGA seems to have
stuck. Also known as "Step 8" of the UDA. It purports to show that
materialism and mechanism (aka computationalism) are fundamentally
incompatible. It is closely related to Tim Maudlin's Olimpia argument.
I wrote a preprint which is available from
http://www.hpcoders.com.au/blog/?p=73 if you're interested in knowing
a bit more, or at least is a source of references, if you think I'm
too turgid.
Thanks. I downloaded your short paper. I can see why the extended argument on the
everything list have failed to move me. The gaps in your argument are rather evident.
You state that if computationalism is valid, then all possible experiences are
instantiated by the dovetailer. But nowhere do you define what is a possible experience.
It seems to depend on the fact that the dovetailer runs all possible computer programs.
In that case, it runs a program in which in the next instance I become lighter than air
and can float around the room!
In fact, I can write computer programs where the laws of physics change from instant to
instant. Why do we not experience these things?
Aye, there's the rub. Bruno claims that such capricious sequences of experience must have
small measure. But I think the "must" means "so that my theory will hold water." Anyway
he admits it's an open problem to show that the UD doesn't just produce experiential confetti.
Brent
ISTM that you are simply assuming that 'possible' means 'possible within the bounds of
the physical laws that govern the world we live in.' I think you might see the problem
with such an assumption.
Bruce
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