On 24 Mar 2015, at 06:31, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 3/23/2015 10:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Mar 24, 2015 at 02:17:40PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
If you take the block universe model seriously then we are nothing
more than conscious recordings!
Fair point!
I don't know what MGA stands for, or what it means, so I can't
comment on that.
Ha - it's in the title of this thread!
I can enter a thread without knowing what the title means!
It's Bruno Marchal's "Movie Graph Argument" (I would probably have
translated it as "Filmed Graph Argument", but MGA seems to have
stuck. Also known as "Step 8" of the UDA. It purports to show that
materialism and mechanism (aka computationalism) are fundamentally
incompatible. It is closely related to Tim Maudlin's Olimpia
argument.
I wrote a preprint which is available from
http://www.hpcoders.com.au/blog/?p=73 if you're interested in
knowing
a bit more, or at least is a source of references, if you think I'm
too turgid.
Thanks. I downloaded your short paper. I can see why the extended
argument on the everything list have failed to move me. The gaps
in your argument are rather evident. You state that if
computationalism is valid, then all possible experiences are
instantiated by the dovetailer. But nowhere do you define what is
a possible experience. It seems to depend on the fact that the
dovetailer runs all possible computer programs. In that case, it
runs a program in which in the next instance I become lighter than
air and can float around the room!
In fact, I can write computer programs where the laws of physics
change from instant to instant. Why do we not experience these
things?
Aye, there's the rub. Bruno claims that such capricious sequences
of experience must have small measure. But I think the "must"
means "so that my theory will hold water." Anyway he admits it's
an open problem to show that the UD doesn't just produce
experiential confetti.
So why do we waste time on such an incomplete theory?
I would say that rather than such random sequences of experiences
having small measure, they must dominate.
OK. So the winning program in the FPI limit of what happen below the
subst level, "we" learn to manage that noise. Why not? That fits with
Feynmann formulation of QM. We would have, to sum up terrribly:
In the work of the UD, the winner (the one generating the stable
illusion) is SUM on all e^iUD.
I think somehow that is correct, and I show that there is already the
shadow of something like that being justify by the reasoner reasoning
on itself and its consistent extensions.
We need the glue of laws to hold our sequence of experiences together
Our dreams, yes. I suggest to "dream" a sequence of experience.
particular case are given by the awake state relative to some
computation(s).
-- and these laws can only come from experience.
They can be inferred from experience. But they might be justifiable by
a deeper (theological) theory, which would explain the origin and
necessity of the physical laws.
It is clear that computationalism fails and that physicalism, with
its given laws, wins the day.
You are quite quick here. Not sure which day you talk about, as I am
usually out of time those days ;)
Bruno
Bruce
Brent
ISTM that you are simply assuming that 'possible' means 'possible
within the bounds of the physical laws that govern the world we
live in.' I think you might see the problem with such an assumption.
Bruce
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