On 26 Mar 2015, at 13:06, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2015-03-26 13:02 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-03-26 12:13 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
    Quentin Anciaux wrote:

        2015-03-26 8:05 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett

This comes back to my original question: since all possible
        programs
            are run by the dovetailer, how do we ensure that conscious
        beings
see an ordered and predictable world. Only a set of measure zero
            among all possible programs would give that result.

        Yes, it seems to me, we should see white noise, but maybe a
selection attribute must be in play... like an anthropic argument.


    Anthropic arguments are not going to work with computationalism
    because there is no basis on which you can assume underlying
    deterministic physical laws.


It seems to me it works relatively.... consciousness like ours can only experiment worls ordered like ours... even if almost all dreams/ worlds produced by mathematics are not like that and do not allow of consciousness like ours, as you can only experience worlds like ours, it's no magic that you do... like with Quantum Immortality, you cannot experience being dead, so no wonder you find yourself alive, even if in almost all worlds you're dead (or not existing at all).

But we do not need the degree of order that we observe. We could survive perfectly well with a reasonable number of miracles -- laws that don't quite work always. And there are vastly more possible worlds of that sort than those that are strictly deterministic. The measure problem gets you every time.

Well we don't know that we could survive in such world...but even, if MWI is correct, most instances of me goes everytime in such worlds... and some of us don't, why wonder that it's a miracle when it's a given there will always be a me in a non magic world ? I wonder why I'm not in a magic world... because I'm not.

OK. That's why when I ask the universal Löbian u, I ask it to abstract from the cul-de-sac world, where magic like [](santa-Klauss exist) becomes true, or []("0=1"). That abstraction is the move from []p to []p & <>p. You do it also with the stronger move []p to []p & p.

Those moves, limited to the sigma_1 arithmetical truth, that the observers assumed, The realm of RA, + those intensional nuance suggest the structure on which the observable get permanent and sharable, but also the no sharable part.

That's only a beginning of a solution. It might fail, but up to now, the observable seem to have good quantization making them already close to quantum logics, algebra of projectors.

Bruno


Quentin



Bruce

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