Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Mar 2015, at 16:35, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
If my mind is being run on two separate computers, I can't know which
one of the two, and I can't say that my last remembered moment was run
on one or other or my next anticipated moment will be run on one or
other. If one computer stops it makes no difference to me and if a
third computer running my mind comes online it makes no difference to
me. So effectively there is only one conscious moment. Under physical
supervenience, stopping all the computers stops the conscious moment.
I am OK. I think Quentin is arguing in the reducto ad absurdum part.
In a sense both Russell is righ (there is only one 1p-experience), and
Quentin is right: we can attribute consciousness in each running (but
then if we attribute it to the physical activity token: we get the
absurd conclusion: playing records and real-time consciousness supervene
on a static film, etc.
One problem is that this is an invalid "argument from incredulity". The
fact that you find this conclusion absurd is not an argument against the
conclusion: it is merely a statement about how you fell about the
conclusion -- which could be right or wrong, and in either case does not
depend on how you feel about it.
I think there are important points buried here and I will attempt to
explore them in more detail in another post -- I am rather short of time
today.
Bruce
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