On 27 Mar 2015, at 05:13, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 3:16 AM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:
PGC - I think you may have skimmed over too much for me to grasp
what you're saying. But maybe not. So .... does contradicition arise
because you assume to start with that consciousness is created by
computation, then show that it would also (assuming physical
supervenience) arise from something that isn't computation?
Bruno will kick my butt for vulgarizing his thesis in this
improvisatory, overly short, imprecise manner. I suspect you're
still assuming physical universe without being aware of it.
I'm still not sure where the dreams come in, however. (Or the
zombies...)
On the subject of counterfactual correctness, isn't that the point
of Olimpia and Klara? My problem with counterfactual correctness is
(probably the same as Maudlin's?) -- how does the system know it's
counterfactually correct if it doesn't actually pass through any of
the "what-if" states?
"The system" is what here? "It" referring to what here? Would you
tend to interpret these as physical or comp objects?
Remember that comp supervenience requires physics to become part of
machine psychology/theology; thus every explanatory potency of a
physical universe is left behind.
I will kick your but for going too quick here, as at this stage (MGA)
we are supposed to explain why physics get secondary on computer
science/arithmetic.
The association is some sensation [of my joy in space-time (x,t)] to
[type] of relative computational state.
To put it another way, when you have a recording of the conscious
computational states being replayed, what difference could be made
by the presence (or absence) of all the extra bits that would deal
with counterfactual correctness if a different computation was being
replayed, but happen in this case not to be used? I can't see how
this could make any physical difference to the states being replayed
(unless counterfactual correctness introduces some nonphysical magic
into the system?)
A machine from which we remove some redundant parts resulting in a
finite set of states or executions looses counterfactual
correctness: The movie is not conscious. The universal machine
viewing it via types, not tokens, of possible activities keeps CC
intact, with consciousness supervening on potential activities, and
not some brittle, particular branch of the same.
And yes, we can cite all manner of quantum weirdness and state that
consciousness supervenes on physical processes that are not
actualized. This is reasonable since measurements depending on
potential observations that are non-actualized depend on CC. But
here, Bruno iirc pointed out that this would be a case of tokens
rather than types. In short "Bruno will definitely kill me for
simplifying and shortening as much as I have" sense, consciousness
relative to computational state of a universal machine supervenes on
set of possible accessible extensions of these states distributed on
the entirety of the UD. PGC
OK. MGA is really for those who want to move on the hypothesis of a
little "real" universe supposed to select one (unique?) computations
making them more real than their doppelgangers and variants in
arithmetic. We can prove nothing about reality, but we can prove that
with computationalism, this introduce a non Turing emulable magic
capacity to some universal machine: the material one, which is close
to a contradiction.
What some people seems to lack is the amazing and not completely
trivial discovery that some number relation are Turing universal.
I feel like it will be time to come back a bit on the phi_i and
w_i ... :)
Bruno
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