On 3/28/2015 2:06 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 28 mars 2015 00:50, "meekerdb" <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> a
écrit :
>
> On 3/27/2015 3:21 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>> Le 27 mars 2015 23:09, "meekerdb" <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> a écrit :
>> >
>> > On 3/27/2015 4:06 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> 2015-03-27 11:44 GMT+01:00 LizR <lizj...@gmail.com
<mailto:lizj...@gmail.com>>:
>> >>>
>> >>> On 27 March 2015 at 23:24, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com
<mailto:allco...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> >>>>
>> >>>> 2015-03-27 10:12 GMT+01:00 LizR <lizj...@gmail.com
<mailto:lizj...@gmail.com>>:
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> On 27 March 2015 at 19:28, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com
<mailto:allco...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> The ab asurdo is showing computationalism is incompatible with physical
supervenience, not that it is true.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Yes sorry, "reject" was a poor choice of words. I meant argue from the comp
position rather than the materialist one, and know what I'm talking about.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> In the end by being forced to accept consciousness must supervene on the movie
+ broken gate... If you believe it, then you've abandon computationalism as a theory of
the mind as the movie+broken gates is not a computation... Or you can keep
computationalism and abandon physical supervenience.... QED
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Yes I realise that. The same applies to Maudlin. All I wanted to know at the
moment was how the contradiction arises in the MGA.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>> It seems to me that's what I explained...
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> I'm sure it does. As I said, I can't quite get my head around it, so it's
unlikely a quick overview is going to help me do so. (After all I couldn't follow
Bruno's explanation, which involved smoke and mirrors, or something similar.) Maybe I'm
just the wrong type of geek to be able to grok this argument, but I keep trying.
>> >>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> it arises because under computationalism, it is assumed consciousness is
supported by a computation.... under computationlism + physical supervenience, it
assumed the computation is eventually supported by physcial activity and eventually this
leads to attribute consciousness to the record, which is not a computation,
contradicting the assumption of computationalism...
>> >>>>
>> >>> Yes, I can see that if you are led to attribute consciousness to a record then
that will contradict the original assumption. But I haven't yet been able to see how the
MGA leads to attributing consciousness to a record. I'm sure it does show that, but for
me it doesn't quite click. Maybe I'm doomed to never get an intuitive grasp of the argument.
>> >
>> >
>> >>
>> >> 1- It is assumed you have a machinery/program that is conscious. (a real
conscious AI)
>> >> 2- You have (for example) a conversation with it.
>> >> 3- While doing that conversation, you record all inputs fed to the
machine.
>> >> 4- You replay those inputs to the machine.
>> >> 5- Assuming in 3 the machine was conscious, replaying the same inputs, the machine
should still be conscious.
>> >> 6- You remove from the machine all the transistor not in use during that
particular run (given the recorded input)
>> >> 7- You replay those inputs to the ("crippled") machine.
>> >> 8- Assuming in 3 and 5 the machine was conscious, replaying the same inputs, the
machine should still be conscious as in 5 (because what you removed wasn't in use anyway).
>> >> 9- You break one transistor, but you make a device (in the MGA it's the projection
of the record on the graph) that permits (even if the transistor is broke) to mimic the
output at the exact moment it should have happen if the transistor wasn't broken (like
the lucky cosmic ray replacing the firing of a neuron).
>> >> 10- Assuming in 3,5 and 8 the machine was conscious, replaying the same inputs,
the machine should still be conscious as the broken transistor while not working did
nonetheless gave the correct output thanks to the lucky ray/devide/movie projection.
>> >> 11- You do 9 for all the transistor, so as to leave only the mimic...
>> >> 12- Assuming in 3,5,8 and 10 the machine was conscious, then the machine is still
conscious while no computation occur anymore.... contradicting computationalism.
>> >>
>> >> From that, either computationalism is false or physical supervenience is
false.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > A good outline, but it doesn't address the question of counterfactual correctness.
After step 6 the machine can no longer respond correctly to a different input - it and
whatever computation it does, is no longer counterfactually correct.
>>
>> Assuming non active parts are needed (negating the move of step 6) basically means
physical supervenience is false.
>
>
> ?? Of course the non-active parts are needed for different inputs - otherwise they're
not needed for anything and need not be part of the AI.
Not for that particular run... If you say they are for that run, then you're saying
physical supervenience is false.
>
>
>> > Of course you can expand the AI to include so much of the world that there are
effectively no inputs; which is the same as saying it computes the outputs for all
possible inputs. But then it has become a Matrix type world unto itself.
>>
>> Here you're talking about the level at which the emulation occurs... Or, the
conclusion is valid for any finite level, whatever it is.
>
>
> My point is that if the level has to be very large, e.g. the whole universe, then no
reversal has been achieved;
It's dubious it would have to be so large... Meaning is internal to the conscious
program, it is it who internalize and record it's input... Inputs in the end are only
numbers, the what it means come from the program itself (if it's conscious, as the what
it means is the 1st person POV).
But that seems to rely on something (a soul) in addition to the numbers that is conscious
and supplies the meaning. Bruno's idea is that the "meaning" is just a relation to other
numbers. But what other numbers? I think it's the other numbers that would, from an
external viewpoint, be a simulation of the world. Some number in the conscious program
would refer to the Moon in the sense that they were related to a lot of other numbers that
represented the Moon.
Brent
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