On 27 Mar 2015, at 12:34, LizR wrote:
On 28 March 2015 at 00:06, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
1- It is assumed you have a machinery/program that is conscious. (a
real conscious AI)
2- You have (for example) a conversation with it.
3- While doing that conversation, you record all inputs fed to the
machine.
4- You replay those inputs to the machine.
To make sure I have this right - you reboot it, or whatever - this
is a machine that starts from the same starting state as the one you
talked to originally. It doesn't remember the first conversation,
and hence by hypothesis goes through the same states as before.
5- Assuming in 3 the machine was conscious, replaying the same
inputs, the machine should still be conscious.
6- You remove from the machine all the transistor not in use during
that particular run (given the recorded input)
7- You replay those inputs to the ("crippled") machine.
8- Assuming in 3 and 5 the machine was conscious, replaying the same
inputs, the machine should still be conscious as in 5 (because what
you removed wasn't in use anyway).
OK
9- You break one transistor, but you make a device (in the MGA it's
the projection of the record on the graph) that permits (even if the
transistor is broke) to mimic the output at the exact moment it
should have happen if the transistor wasn't broken (like the lucky
cosmic ray replacing the firing of a neuron).
OK
10- Assuming in 3,5 and 8 the machine was conscious, replaying the
same inputs, the machine should still be conscious as the broken
transistor while not working did nonetheless gave the correct output
thanks to the lucky ray/devide/movie projection.
11- You do 9 for all the transistor, so as to leave only the mimic...
Aha. Yes that makes sense. It's a slippery logical slope ...
12- Assuming in 3,5,8 and 10 the machine was conscious, then the
machine is still conscious while no computation occur anymore....
contradicting computationalism.
Yes, so you are finally playing just a recording because for every
component you have to know exactly what its outputs were, so you
have to record everything, not just the inputs. At this point you
have shown that either consciousness can supervene on playing back a
recording OR that consciousness doesn't supervene on the original
physical substrate that was supposed to be performing the computation.
From that, either computationalism is false or physical
supervenience is false.
Hmmm....I'm not sure where I sit on that. I do feel like some
sleight of hand has been pulled - not intentionally, of course.
Perhaps the broken version might still be conscious, which means
that ... eek. That's like saying Klara's conscious despite being
inert, isn't it?
I think it's the "thinking about what it all means afterwards" part
that ties my brain in knots. I want to just throw my hands up and
say "well of course physical supervenience doesn't work! How can a
bunch of atoms do that, anyway?" But then they do seem to ...
Looks you understood Liz. Nice explanation Quentin. Might comment more
later.
Liz, to understand MGA is really like understanding that there is
something that we don't understand. We just make the question more and
more precise, and at some point we can ask what the average universal
number thinks about all this. (We do have something like computer
science. UMs knows already a lot, and can guess and hope for more, as
the theorems of Solovay make precise).
Bruno
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
