On Tuesday, March 31, 2015, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 30 Mar 2015, at 10:06, LizR wrote: > > On 30 March 2015 at 19:26, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','stath...@gmail.com');>> wrote: > >> Fading qualia in the setting of normal behaviour, if logically >> possible, would destroy the common idea of consciousness that we have. >> It would mean, for example, that you could have gone blind last week >> but not realise it. You would look at a painting, describe the >> painting, have an emotional response to the painting - but lack any >> visual experience of the painting. If that is possible, what meaning >> is left to attribute to the word "qualia"? >> >> Well, it would mean that comp is false, because the electronic > replacements are not generating any conscious experience despite having > their I/O matched to the rest of the brain. > > > > Yes, there would be p-zombies. Behaving like conscious person, but without > any private knowledge, qualia, sensation or consciousness. >
And there would also be the possibility of partial p-zombies, which would mean that private knowledge, qualia, sensation and consciousness make no subjective difference, or equivalently that they don't exist. > That would mean there is something else involved, something that isn't > generated by computation. > > > > That would entail that indeed. > > But computationalism is not claiming that there is not something else > involved, indeed the "true" relations, as in the difference between []p & p > and []p. This relates the machine to a non nameable first person knower. > > I think Brent intuit this. He use the term "our world" for that, and this > is the "<>t" added to the []p to get a "physical world" (before "comp" > which will be the restriction of the sigma_1 sentences). It is an indexical > conception of world: this reality (in which I believe). > > Consciousness and computation are not related to the static > representations but in their true relations. > > The sigma_1 relations, and only them, verifies p <-> []p, the logic avoids > collapse, because <>p is not sigma_1. > So, those sigma_1 relation collapse truth and representations, at that > level, but self-reference and measurement complexifies the logic. > > Truth extends computability, in fact provability extends computability, in > the constructive or not, transfinite. But Truth extends properly all > machines' provabilities, or the locally effective sets of belief, as the > machine can discover when introspecting itself (in the Gödel, Post, Kleene > manner). > > I might need to explain to you the difference, that you might know well, > but still discard from the theory, between the truth that 2 + 2 = 4, and a > proof of this, for example provided by some proving machine. > > Then you need to understand the working of a computer, or of any universal > (Turing) system, and understand how they all can implement each others. > Given that elementary arithmetic is such a system, a computation can be > defined by relations between numbers. > > At the sigma_1 (or sigma_0) level truth fuse with provability, but when > machine looks at themselves the complexity crops well above the sigma_1 > level, and the relations between p and []p get, well, more complicated > (that is why we get 8 hypostases). > > Consistency (<>t) is Pi_1 and is the typical truth about the machine that > the machine cannot justified about herself: but she can discover the fact > as she can justified <>t -> ~[]<>t, and actually missing []<>t. With the > Plato lexicon this gives all Protagorean virtue including intelligence (by > the definition I gave). > > The protagorean virtue are those which leads to the contrary when (self, > or not!) asserted: they are the proposition or state attribute obeying []x > -> ~x. Like moral, happiness, conscience, intelligence, love, security, and > also the unnameable attributes. > > Smullyan's "Forever Undecidable" is a good introduction to the logic of > self-reference. By a famous succession of theorems, a simple couple of > modal logic, G and G*, sums it all at the 3p propositional level. And that > is enough to define the variants []p & p in G (in the machine language > term, or arithmetic). > > When the universal machine introspects, she already get contradictory > intuition about reality and herself. But she can overcome them, in > different ways and modes. > > Bruno > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com');> > . > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list@googlegroups.com');>. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com');> > . > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list@googlegroups.com');>. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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