On 01 Apr 2015, at 12:33, LizR wrote:
On 1 April 2015 at 22:18, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 01 Apr 2015, at 02:05, LizR wrote:
Well, no, there is no TOE that describes all features of the
physical universe yet.
But if comp is true, there is. If comp is true, the theory with the
axioms Kxy = x + Sxyz = xy(zy), or elementary arithmetic HAVE TO
describe all feature of the physical universe. If not comp is false.
With comp, we cannot add anything to elementary arithmetic or to any
sigma-1 complete set. That is the point of the reasoning. That we
don't succeed, or have not yet extracted it is another point. The
TOE is there. All the physical (but non geographical, nor
historical) feature of physics must be explained by elementary
arithmetic, or computationalism is false. That follows from the UDA.
OK, but as you say - if comp is true. And I'm not saying you need to
prove it's true because I know that's impossible. But as far as I
know, no one has yet derived a convincing amount of physics from comp,
I have derived the propositional logic of the observable. I invite
anyone to test it with nature, more than I have already done.
Then it is the only theory in twon which distinguish the justifiable
from the non justifiable about the observable and the non-observable.
That is more, than the current physics. (Except for David Albert who
does address the problem in its Bohmian interpretation of QM, and some
few others, but unaware of the computer science restriction on what
can prove machine about themselves).
so we don't yet have convincing evidence that it may well be true,
if you see what I mean. (I think Bruce says the same thing in a post
i'm about to read!)
Well, I think that deriving quantum logic is more than you might
think. But to explain this I guess we would need to go deeper in the
technical details. With the quantum logic you have the "yes-no"
experiments, and if it verifies some conditions, it determine the
measure, and all probabilities, then Noether theorem can almost add
all the rest, probably with some help from the number 24. The
theoretical physicists have already done a large part of the work. But
they still invoke a physical universe for the existence criteria,
which is where comp implies the reversal, and gives the tools to
distinguish the quanta and the qualia (where the most honest
materialist if forced to "explain-away" consciousness).
Then, I might not be a believer in comp, but 99,999% of the scientists
(being monist materialist or dualists) do.
The dualist are more honest, generally, as they admit invoking some
miracle.
The monist materialist either invokes a miracle without saying (some
even without noticing it) or they conclude "correctly" that
consciousness does not exist (which for me is a reductio ad absurdum
of materialism: you don't need UDA if you are simultaneously convinced
by Dennett and conscious.
The point is theological or psychological. Does the person exist?
Let us define God by what is at the origin of things, or illusion of
things, or reality.
Then the basic instinct of the people on this list is an intuition
that such a god is (extensionally) equivalent with the "everything",
and we have two nice candidates, which have almost precise
mathematical definitions:
1) A universe or multiverse, described by the wave equation (Everett,
or Bohm, or Von Neumann, ...MWI or not-MWI), which, when interpreted
literally on some quantum vacuum can give rise to all possible quantum
relative states.
That solution is nice, especially that it randomizes away the white
rabbits, and so seems already to be at least one solution of the comp
measure problem.
2) ... well, 2 is more a scheme of provably equivalent candidates: any
first order specification of any universal machine/sytem/Language
(possibly with oracles) will do. The starting Logos, if you remember
Plato.
Roughly speaking 1) say it is that universal number, at the exclsuion
of all the others, and then has the problem that it has to eliminate
consciousness. 2) follows from comp. If we bet on comp, (or extreme
weakening of comp, I use comp to simplify the things, löbianity
persists on a large class of non Turing emulable entities), the only
one way to get both the quanta and the qualia is to look inward.
Gödel's discovered that we can interrogate axiomatizable theories
(machines) about themselves, and showed both their incompleteness, and
the KEY fact that they can prove their own incompleteness,
illustrating that machine looking inward, with elementary inference
inductive abilities, can "see something", notably their ignorance and
the productivity of that ignorance. Computer science described that
ignorance, in many ways, with usually complex lattices structures, and
complex logics. But in our setting, that ignorance is described by
three logics G* \ G, Z1* \ Z1; X1* \ X1. Those gives the justifiable
and non justifiable parts about the justifiable and the non
justifiable, and about the observable with the non observable, and the
sensationalizable and the non sensationalizable.
This gives the person some responsibility in the arithmetical game,
and save consciousness from reductionism.
All what I try to say, is that science has not decided between
Aristotle theology and Plato theology. Physics describes wonderfully
well Nature, but physics is not physicalism: the metaphysical doctrine
that there is a primitive physical universe, and that everything
emerges from that.
In particular, if we assume computationalism, I try to explain that it
does not fit with the aristotelian theologies, but that, on the
contrary, it fits incredibly nicely with platonism and even more with
neoplatonism, and even neo-pythagoreanism.
Many physicalists use computationalism, or mechanism to argue that the
mind-body is solved. What they do, when formalized in arithmetic
consists in saying that God is Z1 (say), where comp says that the
roots of physics, and consciousnes are in Z1* \ Z1.
Physicalist or materialist, when using comp, as most do (not always
knowingly), make a theological error, which explains probably why they
eliminate the consciousness problem, away, or under the rug.
Even Hao Wang, an expert on Gödel, confuses materialism and mechanism,
when he criticized Gödel's Platonism.
Sade and Lamettrie too, although Sade is gifted to not hide completely
the contradiction in the background.
I believe in free will, Liz, but I am not sure about free thinking.
I prefer the commandant of the plane not being a believer in flying
elephants.
I am not sure the humans will make it if they continue to be so bad,
so dogmatic, in theology. Today people come to belief in instruments
and power, and we can see where that can lead.
You must not judge machine theologies only by the comparison with what
physicist have inferred, but look at the whole picture, including the
person(s).
I am astonished, and a bit sad, as I would learn something, that the
"toy" machine's quantum logics are not yet refuted.
Bruno
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