On 14 April 2015 at 13:13, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > On 4/13/2015 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> On 14 April 2015 at 08:21, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com> wrote: >> >>>> Not only is consciousness logically duplicable, it is duplicable as a >>>> matter of fact, since that is what happens in everyday life. There is a >>>> question as to whether we could do it with a computer or with chemicals, >>>> but >>>> that does not have any bearing on the philosophical problem of personal >>>> identity. >>> >>> >>> It might be useful if you or Bruce could provide a formal definition of >>> the >>> problem of personal identity. >> >> The problem is to decide what it takes for a person to persist as the >> same person from moment to moment. >> >>> Is personal identity anything more than a bunch of information -- >>> memories >>> and learned behaviors? If it is just that, then it seems obvious to me >>> that, >>> if you duplicate a person, both copies will have exactly the same >>> personal >>> identity at the moment they are created and start to diverge immediately >>> after. >> >> I can't see how, logically, personal identity could be more than >> mental contents. > > > I can. It could include a predilection to learn this or ignore that, an > ability to follow logical argument or not, a tendency to whistle while > working,...
Which I would also classify as mental contents. I did not mean to imply it was just memory. > If you suddenly lost all your narrative memories and they were transferred > to me, replacing my memories, then I (this body) would think I was Stathis > and you (that body) wouldn't know it's name. Yet with some interaction your > friends might conclude that you were still Stathis, who was suffering > amnesia, while I, who claimed to be Stathis, behaved very strangely was an > impostor. > > Brent > >> Suppose it were an extra thing - a soul. It turns out >> that the soul is destroyed if I sin and eat chocolate. I eat >> chocolate, and my soul is destroyed; but I feel the same and I behave >> the same. What have I actually lost? >> >>> Even if some protocol is used to keep both copies experiencing exactly >>> the >>> same stimuli, there are still two first person views. I don't think that >>> a >>> first person view and a personal identity are the same thing. >> >> If the copies are running in lockstep then I would say there is only >> one stream of consciousness, and nothing is lost by terminating one of >> the copies. >> >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
