On 4/13/2015 2:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com
<mailto:allco...@gmail.com>> wrote:
2015-04-13 23:08 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','stath...@gmail.com');>>:
On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','allco...@gmail.com');>> wrote:
2015-04-13 19:50 GMT+02:00 Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com>:
On Tuesday, April 14, 2015, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything
List
<everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
*From:*everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of
*Telmo Menezes
*Sent:* Monday, April 13, 2015 7:49 AM
*To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
*Subject:* Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 2:55 PM, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Apr 2015, at 05:31, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The philosophical literature is full of extended
discussions on
this, and it is widely understood that ideas such as brain
transplants and duplicating machines play merry havoc with
our
intuitive notions of personal identity.
Yes, it simply vanish. Personal identity is an illusion,
but the FPI
is not, and that result is not used in the reversal, so I
prefer to
let is for other threads and topics.
That seems like a flat contradiction. Personal identity is
an
illusion but First Person Indeterminacy is not. You can't
have first
person anything if you do not have a notion of personal
identity.
I am actually very suspicious of any argument which begins,
or ends,
with "X is an illusion." Be X consciousness, personal
identity, free
will, space, time, or anything else. The theory is supposed
to
explain our experience of these things. Writing them off as
"illusions" is not an explanation.
Only if the theory fails to explain how the illusion
arises. For
example, there was a persistent illusion that the universe
revolves
around the earth. Astronomy eventually showed that not to
be the
case, also explaining why it looks that way.
Telmo – I agree with you. An argument for something being an
illusion needs to show how the illusion emerges out of the
underlying reality; it needs to demonstrate the mechanisms
that
drive the illusion and how they work to transform the
actual real
events/experiences/etc. into whatever is subsequently
perceived as
experienced or real. Simply saying that something is an
illusion is
not adequate; I agree with that. And I think your example
of the
Aristotelian earth centric universe, is a good one. The
mechanism by
which it produced the illusion was demonstrated in that
case.
Here's the mechanism: my body is destroyed, and another similar
body is
created. Because it's similar, it thinks it's me. If two were
created,
both would think they were me.
It would, if functionalism/computationalism is true... but it could
be for
example, that causaly linked matter till birth (or before...) is
necessary
(why not...) for being that particular individual... as my current
body even
if all its matter is continuously replaced, it is not replaced in
one go, it
is as said "continuous", all matter composing my body is causaly
linked...
I'm not saying it is like that and that
computationalism/functionalism is
false (well I believe in computationalism), but currently, as we're
nowhere
near to have the ability to make copies of ourselves... it's hard
to say,
and as we have no 3rd persons reproduceable and sharable test to be
convinced that the copy would really be us (we only have a
metaphysical
believe and a theory to say it should be)... even if that copy was
made of
flesh and blood and that a super high res scan would show that it
has the
exact same atoms with the exact same properties as the living body
it was
copied from... we would still have no proof it would be the same
person...
we would have a theory that if we succeed to "copy" a person and if
the
resulting copied person was alive and well and claimed to be the
same as the
"original" that indeed the copy and the copied would be the same
person...
but that is not a proof... (but that is what I believe it would
have to be).
We would have evidences that it must be (like the copy claiming he
is the
same as the original), but that's all we would have, only the
"copy" would
really *knows* it... like in a quantum suicide experiment, only the
experimenter staying alive would have more and more confidence,
quantum
suicide is true.
Physics is irrelevant to the philosophical problem of personal
identity. It is
only required that consciousness be logically duplicable. If my body is
destroyed and another similar body is created, perhaps by miraculous
means
If miracles come into play... yeah, anything is possible. But I disagree,
it's not
*only* a logical problem. Avec des si, on mettrait Paris en bouteille.
What you're saying is tautological and can be summarized by "If
consciousness can be
duplicated, consciousness can be duplicated"... while it's true, I don't see
anything interesting in that statement.
Not only is consciousness logically duplicable, it is duplicable as a matter of fact,
since that is what happens in everyday life.
That's rather loose. Consciousness occurs everyday. But in what sense is is duplicated?
When I think the same thought again? When you think the same thought as me? I think
duplication referred to duplicating a person, which is not the same as duplicatiing
thoughts since a person has a stream of different thoughts without being a different
person. So, if it's not continuity of the body, what is it about that stream of thoughts
that makes it the consciousness of "a person"? The usual answer is consistency and
coherence of memory. But Bruno seems to think that may be sufficient but not necessary.
Brent
There is a question as to whether we could do it with a computer or with chemicals, but
that does not have any bearing on the philosophical problem of personal identity.
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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