On 4/15/2015 12:58 AM, LizR wrote:
On 14 April 2015 at 14:05, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

    On 4/13/2015 4:35 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

        LizR wrote:

            On 14 April 2015 at 00:42, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
            <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
            <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>>> wrote:

                The expansion of the wave function in the einselected basis of 
the
                measurement operator has certain coefficients. The 
probabilities are
                the absolute magnitudes of these squared. That is the Born 
Rule. MWI
                advocates try hard to derive the Born Rule from MWI, but they 
have
                failed to date. I think they always will fail because, as has 
been
                pointed out, the separate worlds of the MWI that are required 
before
                you can derive a probability measure already assume the Born 
Rule.
                The argument is at best circular, and probably even incoherent.

            In an article published in the 60s (I think) Larry Niven pointed 
out that
            the MWI lead to the following situation - if you throw a dice you 
have 6
            outcomes, i.e. 6 branches. But a loaded dice should favour (say) 
the branch
            where it lands on 6. Hence the MWI doesn't work.

            My reaction to this (when I first read it, probably several decades 
ago now)
            was that you only have 6 MACROSCOPIC outcomes - like derivations of 
the
            second law of thermodynamics, Niven's description of the system 
relies on
            microstates being indistinguishable /to us/. But once you take this 
into
            account there are more microstates ending with a 6 uppermost - and 
hence a
            lot more than 6 branches - the MWI again makes sense using branch 
counting,
            at least for non-quantum dice (I may not have known terms like 
microstates
            at the time, nor was it called the MWI, but that was basically what 
I thought).


        I do not think that classical analogies can ever get to the heart of 
quantum
        probabilities.

            Can't the same be true of any quantum event? The essential 
requirement is
            that any quantum event leads to results which can be assigned a 
rational
            number, rather than an irrational one. This gives us a finite 
number of
            branches, and counting to get the probability. Or do quantum events 
lead to
            results with irrational numbered probabilities?


        Quantum probabilities are not required to be rational: any real value 
between 0
        and 1 is possible. For example, if you prepare a Silver atom in a spin 
up state
        then pass it through another S-G magnet oriented at an angle alpha to 
the
        original, the probability that the atom will pass the second magnet in 
the up
        channel is cos^2(alpha/2). This can take on any real value in the range.


    One argument against branch counting is that if you have two equally likely 
outcomes
    (which can be judged by symmetry) there are two branches; but if a small
    perturbation is added then there must be many branches to achieve 
probabilities
    (0.5-epsilon) and (0.5+epsilon) and the smaller the perturbation the larger 
the
    number required.  Of course the number required is bounded by our ability 
to resolve
    small differences in probability, but in principle it goes as 1/epsilon.

    I think Bruno's answer to this is that for every such experiment there are
    arbitrarily many threads of the UD going throught at experiment and this 
provides
    the order 1/epsilon ensemble.  But this somewhat begs the question of why 
we should
    consider the probabilities of all those threads to be equal since we have 
lost the
    justification of symmetry.  I think this is "the measure problem".


I believe it's an open question as to whether these systems (angle of rotation of a magnet for example) are continuous or quantised. If quantised then there are merely a (perhaps) very large number of branches but no measure problem.

I'm quite willing to say that there can only be finite precision in any physical measurement, so the measurements are effectively quantized even if the theory is built on real numbers. But I don't think that solves the measurement problem. It doesn't justify considering all the possible values equi-probable; that requires some symmetry principle.

Brent

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