On 4/22/2015 9:30 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 16:14, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com <mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote:

    On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com 
<mailto:lizj...@gmail.com>> wrote:
    > On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
    <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
    >>
    >> But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in consciousness
    >> (assuming you could produce a working replica).  I don't see that a gap 
is
    >> particularly significant; a concussion also causes a gap.
    >
    >
    > If comp is correct, gaps make no difference. (That would also be Frank
    > Tipler's argument for immortality, in the absence of cosmic acceleration.)

    Even if comp is incorrect gaps make no difference, since they occur in
    the course of normal life.


But they do have to be explained differently (For example by physical continuity). We're discussing whether scanning a brain and making a (hypothetically "exact enough") duplicate later would affect the consciousness of the person involved. Comp says not, obviously in this case for other reasons than physical continuity.

Of course as Stathis says, "How would you know if your consciousness changed?" You could ask friends and look at documents and check your memories, but it's hard to say what it would mean to notice your consciousness changed. Even if you thought that, maybe it's not your consciousness that's different rather it's your memory of how your consciousness used to be. Motorcycle racers have a saying, "The older I get, the faster I was."

Brent

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