On 23 April 2015 at 14:30, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote: > On 23 April 2015 at 16:14, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote: >> > On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >> >> >> But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in >> >> consciousness >> >> (assuming you could produce a working replica). I don't see that a gap >> >> is >> >> particularly significant; a concussion also causes a gap. >> > >> > >> > If comp is correct, gaps make no difference. (That would also be Frank >> > Tipler's argument for immortality, in the absence of cosmic >> > acceleration.) >> >> Even if comp is incorrect gaps make no difference, since they occur in >> the course of normal life. > > > But they do have to be explained differently (For example by physical > continuity). We're discussing whether scanning a brain and making a > (hypothetically "exact enough") duplicate later would affect the > consciousness of the person involved. Comp says not, obviously in this case > for other reasons than physical continuity.
As I understand it, comp requires simulation of the brain on a digital computer. It could be that there are processes in the brain that are not Turing emulable, and therefore it would be impossible to make an artificial brain using a computer. However, it might still be possible to make a copy through some other means, such as making an exact biological copy using different matter. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
