On 09 Jun 2015, at 18:53, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/9/2015 12:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/8/2015 3:24 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 8 June 2015 at 13:30, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>>
wrote:
If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in
arithmetic
per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic,
since
emergence is a temporal concept.
No it isn't, not in the sense being used here. The concept that
is relevant in this case is ontological priority. If you think
emergence is temporal then you will get very confused by
discussions of the MUH (or even of how the universe arises as a
4D manifold from the laws of physics)
Which law of physics gives rise to the 4D manifold? It is my
understanding that a 4D pseudo-Riemannian manifold was a basic
postulate underlying general relativity -- if that hypothesis
emerged from anything, then it came from the fact that space-time
was observed to be a 4 dimensional structure. So the 4D manifold
is not actually derived from anything other than observation.
Kant made the mistake of thinking that Euclidean space was a
necessary law of thought. Observation proved him wrong. Maybe
observation also proves the MUH wrong?
Observation can't prove anything wrong about a theory that says
everything happens in some universe. ;-)
Everything (consistent) happens in the mind of some machines, but
the laws are in the relative measure, provided notably by the
logical intensional nuance brought by incompleteness.
By "consistent" do you mean logically consistent; thus implying that
no event can be nomologically inconsistent? That is the same as
denying there is any such thing as "laws of physics".
A set of beliefs is consistent if it does not lead to a proof of a
statement and its negation. By completeness we can say that a set of
belief is consistent if there is a world satisfying those beliefs.
It can be nomonological or not. And it has a different semantics
according to which theory, or which intensional nuance of a
provability predicate it is applied.
We might defined nomological inconsistency by [i] <i>p & [i] <i>~p,
for [i] being a material hypostase.
Bruno
Brent
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