On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:55, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:06, meekerdb wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Jun 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Note that it is important to distinguish between
structures that can be described mathematically and the
structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves.
Yes. Quite important. Even after the reversal, although
physics is made purely arithmetical, it is only through
machine's psychology and theology that this happens, and the
science physics are explained to be different from the
mathematical science. For example mathematical
(arithmetical)
existence is some thing like ExP(x), but physical existence
is [2]<2>Ex [2]<2>P(x). Physics remains untouched by comp.,
except it is put on logico-arithmetical grounds. What change
is physicalism in metaphysics. It becomes testable, and
false
if comp is true.
That last seems incoherent. If comp leaves physics untouched that
implies that comp makes no difference to physics and so there can
be no test of comp.
I meant, IF comp is true. Indeed, the test of comp is done by
physics! If comp change the content of physics, and nature follows
physics, it will be comp which has to be abandoned.
Instead you seem to imply that physicalism, a metaphysical
hypothesis, is testable - but how if not via an empirical
prediction?
It is via an empirical prediction. I was in the frame of supposing
comp true. It does not change physics, guven that it is at the
origin of physics (IF true)..
You say it is false if comp is true; but that's not a test.
I say that the idea that we need to assume a physical reality is
false.
That's like the creationists who, when asked what evidence
supports creationism, cite deficiencies in evolution.
? (you lost me). I show that comp has testable consequence in the
content of the physical theories, so let us do the test, or work
toward it (like optimizing G*, the Z and X logics, etc.).
As Brent has suggested. You simply contradict yourself here.
You say "It [comp] does not change physics", and "If comp change the
content of physics, and nature follows physics, it will be comp
which has to be abandoned."
The you say "I show that comp has testable consequence in the
content of the physical theories..."
I see how you make appear a contradiction. As I said, comp is true and
then is confirmed by physics, or comp is refuted by physics, and on
both case comp does not change physics. Just that comp is testable.
These statements are mutually contradictory. If comp does not change
the content of physical theories, then it will have no testable
consequences.
In *that*sense, comp change so much physics that it makes it into a
branch of machine theology. Sure.
If comp does change the content of physical theories, then it might
become testable, but so far you have given no hint as to what
physical content might be changed, or what theories might be in
question, you merely note that physics will take precedence over comp.
Well that is the result. Then the logic of the observable has been
derived, and tested.
Merely talking about metaphysics does not lead to testable
consequences for physical theories.
Unless that metaphysics is derived from comp, which leads to a
theology which include physics, and so get testable.
Anyway, I derive this from comp.
I think we have previously argued at length about the MGA. Because
that argument does not address metaphysics, but the actual physics
of brain processes, it does not refute some metaphysical hypothesis
-- it actually refutes comp itself.
?
This, as has been pointed out, is because the movie graph argument
applies equally to physics as emulated by comp and physics as
investigated by the physicists, independent of any metaphysical
overtones.
Comp makes physics NOT emulable by any machine a priori.
I think that you will find that metaphysical assumptions are not
amenable to either verification or falsification by empirical means.
Some metaphysics might be more useful and productive than others,
but none is empirically testable.
Good, so let us not doing metaphysics, but only cognitive science.
Then a theorem is that if the brain is Turing emulable then physics is
a branch of machine theology, and the physical reality is recovered
through a notion of persistent and stable appearances.
Thanks to Gödel, Löb and Solovay, we can axiomatize completely the
propositional part of the theology, including the propositional part
of physics, and compare it to the logic of the observable. Up to now,
it fits (at a place where many have thought this cannot happen,
because this marry symmetry and antisymmetry at a deep level, without
collapsing the logic.
Bruno
Bruce
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