O n Mon, Jul 6, 2015 Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > > I think this is the key point. In Many Worlds both before and after the > split it's perfectly clear to both the subject of the experiment and to > third party observers exactly who the experimental subject is because the > laws of physics demand that there is only one thing that fits the > description that anyone can see. On the other hand with duplicating > chambers the laws of physics make no such demand. It's clear before the > machine is turned on who the experimental subject is, but after it's turned > on it wouldn't even be clear to the Moscow Man or the Washington Man who > the experimental subject is, at least not unless emotion replaced their > reason and both started chanting "it's me not him" for no logical reason. > And if there is no way for ANYONE (not the first person, not the third > person, not anyone) to identify the experimental subject then there is no > way to know if any prediction made before the duplication was correct or > not. > > > > It doesn't matter to anyone who isn't Moscow man or Washington man. > > It matters to EVERYONE who wants to know if a prediction made before the duplicating machine button was pressed turned out to be correct or not; but I agree it doesn't matter to ANYONE who is only interested in identity and the subjective continuity of consciousness, and that's what the thought experiment was supposed to be about. > > > And both would say "I am the experiencer." > > Maybe that's what you would say but if I had been the one to step into that duplicating chamber I'd say the other John Clark has as much right to say he is the experiencer as I do, and I know for a fact that he'd say the same thing. > > >> > >> Nobody can give a single answer to that question, and I do mean nobody. > > > > > > Wrong, Moscow man and Washington man can both give a single answer: "me". > > Answers are a dime a dozen, correct answers are not. I should have said nobody can give a single *correct* answer to that question. > > > But they're not Helsinki man anymore. > > Yes they are provided "the Helsinki man" is defined as somebody who remembers being T erren Suydam in Helsinki, and that's the definition we'd use if instead of using a copying machine you'd just gotten on a jet and flown from Helsinki to Moscow. So it seems like a reasonable definition to me and I see no need to change it just because the means of transportation has changed. > > > They both were, but then they diverged. > > NO! They diverged from each other but they did NOT diverge from the Helsinki Man, they both remember being the Helsinki man as strongly as ever, but neither the Moscow nor Washington man remembers being the other. Both are the Helsinki Man but neither is the other . > > > > the laws of physics DEMAND that there be exactly one thing we can refer to > as Moscow man and one thing we can refer to as Washington man. Just like > many worlds! Huh??? I've never heard of that law of physics in my life! Did CERN just discover it? Tell me all about it! > > >> > >> The experiencer is the one and only chunk of matter >> >> that the laws of physics allow me or ANYONE to observe that behaves in >> a Helsinki >> >> m >> >> an >> >> ish way. How cold anything be more unambiguous that that? > > > > > It couldn't. > > I agree. > > Ditto for Moscow mannish chunks of matter and Washington mannish chunks of > matter. NO! A matter copying machine could churn out a billion chunks of matter that are all organized in a Terrensuydamian way, and there is no law of physics that forbids a billion people observing every one of them. And there is no law of physics that says one of those billion would have to know that he was different from the other 999,999,999 and know that he was the one true original. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
