On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 11:47 AM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com> wrote: > > β> β >> they're not Helsinki man anymore. They both were, but then they diverged. > > > βLet's assume you're correct, then if the referent of the personal pronoun > "you" in the question "what city will you see?" is the Helsinki man (and I > don't know what else it could be) then the correct answer would be "I will > see no city whatsoever, oblivion awaits". But we both agreed that "you" > would survive the duplicating procedure, so your initial assumption must be > incorrect and the Helsinki man is still around. And because there is no > logical reason to favor one city over the other The Helsinki Man must > survive in BOTH Moscow AND Washington. QED. > > You're the one with the problem with personal pronouns. I'm not using them, so I'm baffled as to why you're bringing them back in. Let's try a different tack. Let's say I have a white Toyota. Then I duplicate it and one of them I paint red and one of them I paint blue. At that point, what is the clearest way to refer to the cars? Personally, I would go with "white Toyota", "red Toyota" and "blue Toyota". I would not be arguing strenuously about the need to refer to all three as "white Toyota". Something about the duplicated cars has differentiated them from the original, so it is clearer to refer to them in terms of what has changed. And yes, cars are not conscious. I'm just talking about the clearest way to refer to the various 'bodies'. Let's stick with Helsinki Man, Moscow Man, and Washington Man. With the understanding that both Moscow Man and Washingotn man believes himself to be the guy that was just duplicated in Helsinki, but they are clearly different people from one another. If we do it that way we can see how easy it is to compare this to Many Worlds, where we might refer to Schrodinger's Cat experiment participants as "superposed experimenter", "dead-cat experimenter", and "live-cat experimenter". Dead-cat experimenter and live-cat experimenter both believe they are also superposed experimenter, but they are clearly different people from one another as they have diverged. To save time I will include the standard reminder that it doesn't matter whether observers of either experiment would have ambiguities with the personal identity of the participants. It only matters whether the consciousnesses are continuous. Terren > To save time I will include the standard canned response used whenever > Bruno's ideas are shown to be illogical, "I confuse the 1p and the 3p". > > John K Clark β > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
