On 26 Jul 2015, at 13:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
David Deutsch has some things to say which are relevant to
discussions of computationalism.
http://edge.org/conversation/constructor-theory
"One of the first rather unexpected yields of this theory has been a
new foundation for information theory. There's a notorious problem
with defining information within physics, namely that on the one
hand information is purely abstract, and the original theory of
computation as developed by Alan Turing and others regarded
computers and the information they manipulate purely abstractly as
mathematical objects. Many mathematicians to this day don't realize
that information is physical and that there is no such thing as an
abstract computer. Only a physical object can compute things."
Aristotelian credo. No problem, but it is not compatible with the
statement that we can survive with an artificial brain, even a quantum
one. That approach makes mysterious mind, matter, and the relation
between. It needs a quantum theory of mind, and if such is needed,
then I am no sure why he would sustain Everett QM. It is a bit like
the dualist or quasi-dualist interpretation of QM in Chalmers book on
the mind. It defends Everett, but defend the type of theory that
Everett made successfully coherent with QM.
Also, saying that mathematicians don't realize something, makes him
taking like if he knew the truth, which contradicts his own
epistemology, and betrays the fact that he does not try to do science
when coming on the fundamental issue, where we can make our hypotheses
precise, without asserting them true, and showing the conequences and
refutability.
It is just that mathematicians does not need the assumption of
physicalness to define and reason about information. Not even about
quantum information, which, Everett QM show to be classical
information as seen from interfering classical computations.
That is also coherent with his last paper on consciousness which seems
non computationalist.
And later:
"Several strands led towards this. I was lucky enough to be placed
in more than one of them. The main thing was that starting with
Turing and then Rolf Landauer (who was a lone voice in the 1960s
saying that computation is physics—because the theory of computation
to this day is regarded by mathematicians as being about
abstractions rather than as being about physics),
Of course I agree with the mathematician. It is the reading of book on
molecular biology, and then on formal systems which decides me to do
math. To say that computations is physics is like to suggest to
someone interested in the game of chess to study the hardware of deep
blues. It is a form of reductionist thinking, and deny that higher
level description can have law which is independent of the
implementations, physical or arithmetical or whatever.
Landauer realized that the concept of a purely abstract computer
doesn't make sense,
Did Landuer realized that the concept of purely abstract natural
numbers doesn't make sense? You get the first one with the second one.
The notion of universal computable functions and relative numbers
makes as much sense to me that the notion of odd numbers.
and the theory of computation has to be a theory of what physical
objects can do to information.
That could lead to an interesting notion of physical computations, but
it is revisionism. Computations have been discovered by mathematical
logicians, and soon proved to exist, or to be emulated by the natural
number relations. Indeed we need no more than the Diophantine
Polynomial Relations.
Also, QM assumes the natural numbers. The more general theory of
waves, eve just trigonometry assumes the natural numbers. The theory
of natural numbers does not assume a physical reality.
Landauer focused on what restrictions the laws of physics imposed on
what kinds of computation can be done."
Can be done relatively to some resource. That is interesting, but is
only a subtheory of special purpose computation. For the universal
computations, the quantum computer is but a special type of Turing
universal system.
"The notion of a purely abstract computer doesn't make sense!" I
find myself to be sympathetic with this view.
I can understand, as it seems you are a partisan of the Aristotelian
dogma: God = Nature. With comp we have the much easier, conceptual
theory: GOD = the natural numbers together with the laws of
multiplication and addition.
This really *explains* where the appearances come from, and why some
can be sharable by growing collection of universal numbers, and why
some are not sharable and look mysterious and inspiring. It explains
both the origin of quanta and the origin of qualia, and thanks to
those quanta, the theory is refutable.
All evidences go for comp, I would say. The neurophysiological
evidences, and the startling MWI confirmation, and the existence of
the arithmetical quantization right where UDA predict they should be.
Now, when you realize how much it is hard for people to change their
mind on Hemp, despite the lies are rather obvious and despite they
exist only since 70 years, you might conceive how much it will be hard
to explain that in theology we are wrong, and also lied, as this
perdure since 1500 years.
In theology, if we except the Greeks and many anonymous people, the
majority have still not learned to say "we don't know", which is the
prerequisite for doing research and try theories.
Bruno
Bruce
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