@ Bruno
>> Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here. personal
>> identity is not a Leibnizian notion.
You need to focus on what these factors govern:
1) international tariffs.
2) the state of the chinese economy.
3) international demand for tea grown in china.
btw. I wasn't talking about Leibnizinan notions of identity. If you were
committed to that you wouldn't be you, let alone H, W or M, one moment to the
next. Even I don't think your metaphysics is that silly.
I can give you arguments but I can't understand them for you. You have to do
that bit. I don't think you'll ever fix step 3 unless you try a bit harder.
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 18:45:40 +0200
On 27 Jul 2015, at 05:04, chris peck wrote:@ Bruno
[John] >> >> Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous, that is a flat
out logical contradiction.
[Bruno] >> Where?
The problem arises because if "You" = "person who remembers Helsinki" then you
ought to be able replace one for the other without truth values altering. Thats
just logic 101.
Not at all. And John Calrk agrees with what I will say here. personal identity
is not a Leibnizian notion.That is why in the math we wuse modal logic, which
is not Leibnizian. Let "Arthur believe p" be []p
zeta(2) = pi^2 / 6 entails zeta(2) is irrationaL IFF pi^2 / 6 is irrational,
but [](zetat(2) is irrational) is not entailed by [](pi^2 / 6 is irrational.
In intensional context, the Leibniz identity rule (two quantities equal to a
same third one are equal) is no more true.
John agrees with this, and he agrees explicitly on the fact that the M guy and
the H guy are the H guy, despite the M guy and the W guy are different guy.
Nothing weird here: personal identity is a modal or intensional notion. The
math exemplifies this in all details, and all this ultimately related to pure
simple extensional relation between numbers.
But, according to you one of these two phrases is false:
"{You} will see only one city" <--- true according to Bruno.
"{person who remembers Helsinki} will see only one city". <--- false according
to Bruno.
No. I have never said that. All I say is that in Helsinki, i expect myself to
have the unique experience of being in a unique city. The problem is not in the
pronom, but in the undersanding that the question bears on first person
experiences, and not on third person localization of the experience.
Since all you have done is replace one phrase for another you have to accept
that those phrases mean something different, otherwise where does the
difference in truth value come from?
Well, in modal context, it is doubly grave to not quote the chole context. I
never say what you, perhaps John, attriubute to me here, but even if I said, it
we are in a modal, intensional context, where John and me agree that we cannot
use the Leibniz identity rule.
"you" can not equal "person who remembers Helsinki", otherwise you are
contradicting yourself. You are saying it is true and false that "you will see
only one city".
You will see two cities. That is true for the third person points of view.
You will see only one city. That is true as a prediction of the subjective,
first person, experience.
This has nothing to do with 1-p, 3-p, p-p confusions
It has everything to do with 1p and 3p pov, as I just illustrated above. That's
obvious as the question is about what you expect to live from the first person
point of view, and you don't expect to have the experience of being in W and in
M, but, as we assume comp, you expect to live with certainty in either W or in
M (as both copies confirms after).
but is a direct consequence of how you define your terms, Bruno.
Sorry, but you just illustrate well that your and Clark's misunderstanding
comes from the 1p and 3p confusion.
The John Clark in Washington cannot deny he is the one having the experience to
live Washington and not in Moscow.The John Clark in Moscow cannot deny he is
the one having the experience to live Moscow and not in Washington.
Both admits that the duplication has introduced an asymmetry, and that they
each got one bit of information.
Bruno
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 19:52:22 +0200
On 24 Jul 2015, at 19:03, John Clark wrote:On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 1:11 AM,
Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> Yes, after the duplication but before the door of the duplicating chamber
is opened John Clark may have a hunch that he (at this point the personal
pronoun is not ambiguous because although there are 2 bodies they are identical
so there is still just one John Clark) will see Moscow when the door is opened
and make a bet. One of the John Clarks will win the bet and one will not; it
can never be determined if "he" won the bet because as soon as the door was
opened the 2 bodies were no longer identical, they had different memories, so
that personal pronoun becomes ambiguous.
> That contradict the fact that you have agreed that both copies are the
Helsinki guy.
After the bodies are duplicated but before the door is opened there are 2
bodies but still only one Helsinki guy because they are identical, when the
door is opened they see different things and thus diverge. They both remain the
Helsinki guy because they have equally vivid memories of being a guy in
Helsinki, but they are no longer each other because they diverged as soon as
the door was opened. I understand how that state of affairs would be strange,
but please explain how it is contradictory.
There is nothing contradictory.
On the contrary, that is a good explanation why P(W v M) = 1, when W and M
refer to the self-localization experience. As you said, the experience diverge.
For one Helsinki guy the measurement is W, and so write W in the diary, and for
the other the measurement gives M, and he write M in his diary. Both agree that
they could not have predicted that result, except by betting "W v M", which is
undermined but true at both place, and obviously the experience "W and M" is,
well, not even an experience at all. It is half an experience, and half an
intellectual belief.
> There is no ambiguity, you are both guys.
"You" is both guys.
Intellectually. The experience have diverged, The outcome of the
self-localization are different. From now on, you are either a guy living in
Moscow having a doppelganger in Washington, OR a guy living in Washington
having a doppelganger in Moscow. You don't become a mysterious entity
experiencing both place simultaneously. Both got one bit of information from
the push+self-localization measurement.
One guy will be in Moscow. One guy will be in Washington. But "you" will see
only one city.
yes, in Helsinki, you can be sure of that/ You push on a button, open a door,
and see only one city, and get a cup of coffee.
You have guessed right the other day. P(coffee) = 1 because "coffee" is
satisfied in both place. But "W or M" is also satisfied in both place, and "W
and M" is false in both place, as W and M refers to the incompatible experience
of seeing Moscow and seeing Washington from the direct first person experience.
Indeed, only the mysterious entity experiencing both places could wriite W and
M, by the definition of the FIRST person experience denoted by W and M.
Bruno Marchal is correct, that is not ambiguous, that is a flat out logical
contradiction.
Where? it is W & M which is a flat out contradiction, when W and M refers to
the first person experience. One diary contains M, the other contain W. None
contain W and M. I hope you are OK with this.
I said it before I'll say it again, if Bruno Marchal wants the words "you will
only see one city" to be true Bruno Marchal is going to have to change the
meaning of the personal pronoun "you" ;
I don't have to change the meaning. Right at the start, the question is about
the expected outcome of a first person experience. You agree that there is a
divergence, so I guess you understood that one write in the diary W, and the
other write M. Those are what makes the divergence to exist. I keep the meaning
of "you", and you are in both city, but the point is that in both city you see
only once city, so the bet P(one city) = 1 was correct, and P(I see two cities
at once when opening the box) = 0. The prediction is on the personal experience
of what is seen when opening the door. It is NOT on the third person
localization of those experiences.
somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki just won't work.
It works perfectly well. After the duplication, I interviewed all the guys who
remember having been the guy pushing on the button in Helsinki, and they all
told me that indeed, as predicted, the self-localizaton measurement gave as a
result only once city. P(one city) was equal as P(coffe), for the exact same
reason: that is what is lived by all the continuations.
Bruno
John K Clark
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
