On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:50 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> >> >> For the sake of clarity and consistency when dealing with this topic John >> Clark humbly requests that Bruno Marchal make the following simple >> changes in future correspondence with John Clark: >> 1) Substitute "John Clark" for the personal pronoun "you". > > > > > We have explained to you that the key is in the difference between 1-Clark > and 3-Clark, or 1-you and 3-you, or 1-me and 3-me. > Since Bruno is clear about all this Bruno should have no difficulty in complying to the request of substituting "John Clark" for the personal pronoun "you". > >> >> >> it is not abaout the lmocation of your bodies, but about the first >> person experience > > > >> > There are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking > about? > > > We have shown that P((W & ~M) v (M & ~W)) = 1, for the exact same reason > that P(coffee) = 1. > > So you can be sure (modulo the hypothesis and the protocole) that you will > have a unique experience of seeing a unique city after pushing the button. > "The" refers to that unique experience. "unique" from the 1-pov, of course, > as from the 3-1 view, they are not unique. But they $are* unique from the > 1-pov, ad as the question is about that 1-pov prediction, it makes sense to > refer to it. > Well now that's all very nice but John Clark still has one question, t here are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking about? > >> You avoid to answer the question/ What do you expect to live after >> pushing the button. > > >> > Avoid the question my ass! Just yesterday John Clark said clear as a bell > "that depends on who "you" is. John Clark would know that in the future > the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see > Washington. [...] And I [John Clark] > > also knew which one would be which, I knew the Moscow Man would get his > photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get his photons from > Washington. [...] > > what Bruno Marchal would expect John Clark neither knows nor cares > because expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have nothing to do > with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self. > > > You make my point by avoiding the question again and again and again. I > think it is hopeless, as you just avoid systematically the question. You > are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The question is what do you > expect to live as first person experience? That depends on who "you" is. John Clark would expect that in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see Washington. And John Clark would also know which one would be which, the Moscow Man would get photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get photons from Washington. W hat Bruno Marchal would expect John Clark neither knows nor cares because expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have nothing to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self. > > > You are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The question is what do you > expect to live as first person experience? > - I expect to die. > - I expect to feel myself in two cities at once. > - I expect to feel myself in only one city. > I, that is to say John Clark in Helsinki, would expect that tomorrow John Clark will feel to be in Moscow, and I would expect that tomorrow John Clark will feel to be in Washington. I would further expect that from **THE** 1P John Clark will not experience anything at all. John Clark would not expect **THE** 1P to exist at all because John Clark expects John Clark to be duplicated. What Bruno Marchal would expect in a similar situation only Bruno Marchal knows, not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have anything to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self. > > > I recall you that we have agreed on the identity criterion > We only agree on Mondays Wednesdays and Fridays, on the other days we disagree except for Sunday, on Sunday I don't know if we agree or disagree. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
