On 04 Aug 2015, at 19:47, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:50 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> For the sake of clarity and consistency when dealing with
this topic John Clark humbly requests that Bruno Marchal make the
following simple changes in future correspondence with John Clark:
1) Substitute "John Clark" for the personal pronoun "you".
> We have explained to you that the key is in the difference
between 1-Clark and 3-Clark, or 1-you and 3-you, or 1-me and 3-me.
Since Bruno is clear about all this Bruno should have no
difficulty in complying to the request of substituting "John Clark"
for the personal pronoun "you".
We did this already, but you came up with non sense again. More than
one person did this. It changes nothing, as the nuance is not in the
name or in the pronouns, but in the 1p/3p difference, or in the 1-1p/
3-1p difference.
For a period of time, I have no more use pronouns, but you kept
confusing the 1p and the 3p, and we get the same non-sense, at it
comes exclusively from that confusion.
It is not the pronoun, or the name, or the person where you are
ambiguous, it is on the point of view.
The question is what can *anyone* expect to *live* (to be conscious
of, first person, subjective experience) in the (iterated, for a
change) self-duplication?
All sequences? No, as comp explains that NO copies at all will *live*
all experiences.
An arbitrary sequence of W and M? yes, as all copies will confirmed
that they have indeed live a precise particular sequence, and the stat
shows indeed that most look quite arbitrary.
>>> it is not abaout the lmocation of your bodies, but
about the first person experience
>> There are two first person experiences, which one is
Bruno talking about?
> We have shown that P((W & ~M) v (M & ~W)) = 1, for the exact
same reason that P(coffee) = 1. So you can be sure (modulo the
hypothesis and the protocole) that you will have a unique experience
of seeing a unique city after pushing the button. "The" refers to
that unique experience. "unique" from the 1-pov, of course, as from
the 3-1 view, they are not unique. But they $are* unique from the 1-
pov, ad as the question is about that 1-pov prediction, it makes
sense to refer to it.
Well now that's all very nice but John Clark still has one
question, there are two first person experiences, which one is
Bruno talking about?
The one the Helsinki guy expect to live subjectively, which is either
W or M, but cannot be both, nor none.
> You avoid to answer the question/ What do you expect to live
after pushing the button.
>> Avoid the question my ass! Just yesterday John Clark said
clear as a bell "that depends on who "you" is. John Clark would
know that in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the
Washington Man would see Washington. [...] And I [John Clark]
also knew which one would be which, I knew the Moscow Man would get
his photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get his photons
from Washington. [...] what Bruno Marchal would expect John
Clark neither knows nor cares because expectations, correct ones or
incorrect ones, have nothing to do with the continuity of
consciousness or the unique feeling of self.
> You make my point by avoiding the question again and again
and again. I think it is hopeless, as you just avoid systematically
the question. You are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The
question is what do you expect to live as first person experience?
That depends on who "you" is.
No, it works with anybody, even robots, as the 1p definition is 3p
sharable (unlike in the math part which gives a more precise
definition---but it is not needed for grasping the Universal
Dovetailer Argument).
John Clark would expect that in the future the Moscow Man
would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see Washington.
Ok, but we have agreed that both the Moscow man and the Washington man
is the Helsinki man. Your use of "Moscow-man" hides the indeterminacy
when the H-guy differentiate into the H-M-guy and the H-W-guy, so that
they personally become either the H-M-guy, OR the H-W-guy.
here you talk like if the Moscow-man was a new person: but we have
agreed that he is the H-man. Indeed both are, which explains why the H-
man can only be uncertain if he (the 1p, well defined in H) will live
the W or the M experience.
Here you suppress pronouns just to avoid the question, by abstracting
from the definition we have agreed on: both the M and W men are the
same person as the H-man, despite the W-man and the M-man are now
different persons. But they remains both the H-guy, and that is why
the pronouns are not ambiguous.
The only ambiguity is if the question bears on the 1p personal future
subjective experience (guarantied to exist by the mechanist
assumption) or a 3p description of those experience. But that is an
ambiguity which comes only from the fact that you don't read the
question, or fake to misunderstand it.
Also: you talk often like if ("I am in W" and "I am in M") describes
an experience. That does not make sense (with digital mechanism).
((JC will live W) and (JC will live M)) does NOT describe *a*
subjective experience.
Just to be sure do you agree that if in Helsinki, we decide with a
coin between the alternative described just below, but we don't let
you know the result:
- tail : you are duplicated in M and W
- head: you are not duplicated, but teleported to one of the city
(also chosen with a coin)
So you don't know if you will be simply teleported in one of the two
city, or be duplicated in both, once you push the button.
The question is: do you think that without external clue you could
know which one of the alternative has been realized after pushing the
button?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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