On 11 Aug 2015, at 01:43, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Aug 10, 2015 at 4:50 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
> there will be only one 1-view from any of the two 3-1 p view
Oh no, now we have the two 3-1 p view!
We have this since the beginning.
3-JC is refers to the bodies which in this case are in the two cities.
OK, or in non-peepee notation the objective actions of John
Clark's body or bodies.
+ the first person ascribed to the (two) persons (here: the copies).
> 3-1 refers to the subjecyive experience
In non-peepee notation the subjective experience.
Considered ascribed to some person. It is not the 1p view *itself*.
This is capital to grasp to get the result.
> of frst person view
That is redundant because the first person is the only type of
subjective experience there is.
That is why the 1-view = the 1-1-view = the 1-1-1view. But this is
different of the 3-1 view. You can say that both copies have the 1-
view of the H-guy, but none of the copies have the 1-view of the two
copies, as you agree they are incompatible.
> ascribed to both bodies, which is different from the 1p view
lived by the person attached to such bodies.
I have no idea what that means and think your peepee notation
really sucks.. Ascribed by who?
By anyone, and to make things more complex, that includes any copies,
as they can ascribe the 1p view of the Helsinki (himself) to its
doppeganger. Tha "pee-pee" notation has been introduced to invalidate
your point that both 1-views, of both 3-copies exists, but that is a
description from outside of bodies, to which indeed we can ascribe a 1-
view of the H-guy.
If it's the by a third person then the 3-1 view is just the 3 view,
No, because we cannot see or measure or have any direct access to an 1-
view. So 3-1 means that it is something considered from a non owner of
the diary, which nevertheless is interpreted as an 1-view, but not
necessarily our own. I needed to introduce it only to invalidate the
point you made that even if we consider the 1-view, there are both in
W and M, but that is a view from outside (the boxes) and does not
answer the question asked; which is about a personal expectation of a
personal experience.
With the math, where the povs (1-view, 3-view, 3-1 view ...) this is
given by the multimodal logic mixing the
[1]p = []p & p, with []p. The 1-views are (up to a technical nuance
beyond the scope of this post) given by [1]A, The 3view by []A, the
3-1 view by [][1]A, etc.
and if it's the first person then the 3-1 view is just the 1
view.
3-1 is when we talk of the 1-view of someone else.
Like when we say that the guy survived in both W and M. That is true
(assuming comp).
But the 1-views themselves can only W or M, as you have agreed that
those 1-views have differentiated and become incompatible. We cannot
feel to be in both city simultaneously.
So in the 3-1 view, you can say I will survive in both city, but this
entails that in the future 1-views (or 1-1-views) I will feel to be in
only one of those 2 cities.
> 1p are always single solitary
Are? It should be "1p is always solitary" but I think the
idea and not just the grammar is wrong. I can't prove it but I have
a hunch that solipsism is untrue, so right now I think there are
about 7.1 billion 1ps on planet earth and maybe more if animals
are conscious and many probably are.
But they all feel to be different from the others, and that is needed
to predict what can happen to a self-duplicating person, or to the
self-superposing also. That is why we have an FPI in computationalism,
and we have still statistics in the QM without collapse.
So here, you do confuse the 3-1 views and the 1-views, which is a
particular case of 3p/1p confusion.
> In the math translation, eventually, we get a meta-definition
of the 1p-you, more precise than "the one who remember .
Regardless of how advanced the mathematics precision is not
achieved if the symbols used (like the 3-1you) don't mean anything.
"the" is not need in the math part, and makes an easy sense with the
definition of the views based on the diaries (entering or not the
boxes).
> if you agree it bifurcates
Of course I agree that the subjective experience bifurcates
when looking along the timeline in one direction, and it unites
when looking along the opposite direction. And that is why
personal identity can only be defined by looking toward the past and
not the future.
Then how do you justify that someone prepares a cup of coffee, if it
is not because he associates a personal satisfaction to its future
self drinking the coffee. It is enough that anyone makes and drink
that coffee, which is absurd. Without that 1p-prediction, the notion
of experimental verification of any laws would no more make any sense.
It is made implicitly in the whole of experimental physics, and
computationalism makes precise that physics is based on a mind-body
identity link, which is just the one comp shows that it does not work
in robust universe, or just in arithmetic. No problem for today's non
quantum physics, but it is a problem in cosmology (cf Boltzmann brain,
or some UD) or in quantum mechanics, which use implicitly the FPI.
> a simple reasoning (that we have done many times) shows that
you are unable to predict the 1p outcomes of that bifurcation.
Not true the outcome is perfectly predictable. The guy who
intercepts a photon from Moscow will turn into the guy who
experiences Moscow and the guy who intercepts a photon from
Washington will turn into the guy who experiences
Washington. I honestly don't know what more needs to be predicted.
The guy in M sees M, sure, and the guy in W sees W. Nobody doubt this:
it is tautological.
But the prediction is asked in Helsinki. And ask if you will be that M
guy or that W guy. You know you survive subjectively in both city, but
you know that both copies will feel to be in one city, so in Helsinki
"P(W xor M)" = 1, and so, when the guy in M see M, he write M in his
doary, not W & M, and similarly at the other place. So in the 3-1
view, we don't get any information, but in the 1-views, both get one
bit of information.
>> I though you were the guy who kept saying that Everett's
MWI was deterministic.
> In the 3p view, but for the 1p (and here 1p-plural) we
have [...]
I REALLY don't understand your homemade peepee notation! You just
said "1p are always single solitary".
1p are always solitary from their 1p-view. But in the 3-1 view that
can have friends and doppelgangers.
> What your computational theory of mind fails to predict is
the outcome of the result of pushing on the button from the first
person perspective
That is gibberish. In looking toward the future in a world with
person duplicating machines there is no such thing as THE the first
person perspective;
There are two such "the", of you are saying that you just dies when
pushing the button, in which case it is an easy exercise to show that
you dies as well with the simple (without duplication) teleportation,
and thus with any artificial brain, and thus computationalism is false.
such a term is only meaningful in looking toward the past because
things bifurcate going in one direction and converges going in the
opposite direction.
So the W-guy looks at his path and remember being the H-guy.
The M-guy looks at his path and remember being the H-guy.
The prediction that you made (W and M) is confirmed for the 3-1 view,
but is refuted for both the W-guy and the H-guy.
What would you say to the WWMWMMMMW-guy, in the iterated case, who
look at his past, and realized that he has never succeeded to predict
his future until now?
You convince nobody. You are refuted by all your copies (when they
eventually remind themselves of what was asked, of course).
You made slightly clearer that you confuse the 3-1 views with the 1-1-
views. That eases the refutation of your point that there is no first
person, subjective, indeterminacy.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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