On 20 Aug 2015, at 21:21, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Aug 20, 2015 at 4:43 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> the only way John Clark knows how to interpret "
What does happen is 3p, and the question is about the 1p" is that
the 1p does not happen after duplication in which case John Clark
has no idea what "1p" means.
> No the 1p happens in the two places.
The? A 1p happens in two places, and there is nothing very
unusual in 2 diferent things, like 2 different things that go by
the name "you", occupying 2 different places except that due to
technological limitations (not scientific ones) you duplicating
machines haven't been invented yet. But it's coming.
> When I say that the question is about the 1p, it means the
content of the 1p. That is a subjective happening.
Obviously, otherwise it would be 3p unless you've suddenly changed
your homemade peepee notation.
>> After duplication, both copies will have a (single,
definite) subjective experience.
> Sure.
So both will have a 1p and neither will have THE 1p because THE 1p
does not exist.
Each will have the 1p he was attempting to predict in Helsinki. Nobody
will have two 1p from an 1p pov.
> after the duplication, both know very well who they are,
They both say that they are Bruno Marchal and if Bruno Marchal
is rational neither would dispute the other's claim. As for deciding
if one or both or neither is "you" that depends entirely on what
"you" means in a world that has "you" duplicating machines in it.
We have agreed that both are "you".
That is even the reason why we listen to both copies, and both comfirm
the W v M prediction, and both refute the W & M prediction (with W and
M refering to the 1p experiences, see the preceding post if you have
forgotten this).
> computationalism entails it can only be W, or M.
The above depends entirely on what the referent to "it" is.
Goddamn pronouns!
> The guy in Helsinki knows that in advance, and so can predict
P(W v M) = 1, and P(W & M) = 0.
Sure that's possible, if the guy in Helsinki is a fool he could
predict monkeys will fly out of his ass. But I'm more interested in
what will happen that in what some jackass believes will happen.
In that case you change the subject, which is not what will happen,
but what will be experienced (assuming the person believes or assumes
computationalism).
>>I don't assume "comp", remember?
> Sorry, but you accepted the step 0 and the step 1, which
means that by definition you assume or accept computationalism
I accepted computationalism when I was about 16 and can find no
reason to think differently today.
OK, but we don't philosophy. The point is that comp entails step 3.
> abbreviated by comp.
That is no abbreviation!
It is.
As I've said, the way you use your baby talk word "comp" has
little or nothing to do with computationalism.
Then what am I using in step 0, 1, and 2? You have agreed on those
steps. You only mean that computationalism does not entail step 3, but
fail to find a reason why not, except by either confusing 1p and 3p,
or your by changing the question.
>> Usage is always more important that definitions.
> Not in science.
In everything. Definitions are made of words and those words also
have definitions also made of words and round and round we go; the
only thing that breaks us out of that infinite loop is usage. Where
do you think lexicographers got the information to write their
dictionaries? Only one place, usage.
In science we use axiomatics, and you can replace each word by ANY
words. It will change absolutely nothing, except it will look like
jargon. You forget that the WHOLE argument is entirely translated in
arithmetic. part two needs only the believe in elmentary arithmetic, +
at the meta level the thesis by Church-Turing.
> Because you put step 3 in comp,
I have never put anything in "comp".
Then you accept that comp is just an abbreviation of computationalism.
> but step 3 is not part of comp.
I don't care if step 3 is part of "comp" or not.
>> It is up to you to show which of the 2 people after the
duplication who go by the name of "you" is THE One True YOU, the
only "you" that is relevant in determining if the prediction made in
Helsinki was correct or not.
> This is ridiculous. There are no TRUE you,
John Clark is glad Bruno Marchal agrees, but if there is no
TRUE you then Bruno Marchal has no business using that
ambiguous personal pronoun in thought experiments. However there is
a TRUE Ed, two in fact, so that word should be used instead.
> comp entails that [...]
I don't care what "comp" entails.
> Ed is in W and Ed in M is not the same as Ed feels to be in W
and in M.
So Ed is in W but Ed does not feel to be in W and the duplication
has turned Ed into a zombie who feels nothing. Perhaps that is what
"comp" entails but it is certainly not what computationalism
entails; I believe in computationalism but have no opinion about
"comp".
> For the billionth time, you give me the correct 3-1
prediction, but
John Clark is surprised John Clark gave the correct 3-1
prediction because John Clark does not know what a 3-1 prediction is
and has grave doubts that Bruno Marchal does either.
> the question is about the future 1p that you will live,
The future 1p that who will live? And in a world with "you"
duplicating machines why "the future" and not "a future"?
> By saying the "hell with viewing peepee", is like saying "the
hell with the question you asked"
Yes to hell with the "question" because nobody asked a question,
somebody just typed a bunch of ASCII characters and then put a
question mark at the end. And to hell with that.
>> However after the duplication if Bruno Marchal asked
John Clark "are you you in the 1p view or are you you in the 3p
view" John Clark wouldn't have any idea how to respond to such a
silly question.
> Indeed, very silly question. I can't agree more.
Silly though it undoubtedly is It's very unclear why that question
is sillier than "what one and only one city will you see after you
has been duplicated and becomes two?".
> The question is more how you evaluate the chance of seeing
Moscow (say). If you say P = 1, then [...]
John Clark wouldn't say anything until the question is understood
and the identity of that mysterious Mr. You is identified. The
chance of who seeing Moscow?
I think you are just playing with word, as you have agreed that "you"
is not ambiguous before the duplication.
> in the iterated case you must predict MMMMMMM... and the
chance of this diminish like 2^n, as almost all copies confirm.
Exactly what is it that almost all copies are confirming?
The W v M prediction, or more generally, the fact that they are unable
to predict what they will live, among W and M. They confirm the First
Person Indeterminacy (FPI).
>> it has no answer because it is not a question at all, it is
just gibberish with a question mark at the end.
> If that is gibberish, then you are telling me that you die
when you are duplicated.
Who will die when who is duplicated?
I think you are just playing with word, as you have agreed that "you"
is not ambiguous before the duplication.
Look, John, I guess Quentin and others is 100%, as you repeat
systematically the same rhetorical trick. Unless something clear and
new, I will no more answer the post. I don't think anybody understand
your point, and to be honest, I have stopped to believe that you have
any point. I will save some of my answer in case later you pretend to
have refuted the step 3, as it is just obvious from this post and
other recent post that you never did that.
Come on, you don't even try to answer a precise question asked in my
last post.
Bruno
John K Clark
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