On 5 October 2015 at 09:37, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> > On 4/10/2015 6:54 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > If matter is placed in the same configuration as you, it will think it is > you and have all your physical and psychological qualities. This relies on > the assumption that your physical and psychological qualities are due to > the configuration of matter in your body. It does not rely on the further > assumption that the copy be verified. > > > But thinking (or knowing) that it is a copy does require the transfer of > information. Otherwise the only sensible position to take is that there are > two independent persons. > The copy will feel that it is a continuation of the original. In general the copy will not know it is a copy unless it is supplied with the information or encounters the original, and even then it will feel it is the original, despite knowing intellectually that it is a copy. > So this is exactly what I am asking you to consider. Someone who looks >> like you, behaves like you, knows everything that you know, etc. wakes up >> in your bed this morning. Overnight, some physical changes have occurred. >> If you (the person waking up in your bed) are informed that these changes >> consist of a few cells dying and being replaced, you are not worried. But >> what if you are reliably informed that the physical changes involve a >> random process, or something else that would render 'psychological >> continuity' an empty phrase, as you say. You (the person waking up in your >> bed) still feel the same either way, and everyone who knows you agrees you >> seem to be the same person. Would you go around claiming that you were not >> Bruce, or that you are Bruce but have experienced a psychological >> discontinuity, or that you haven't experienced a psychological >> discontinuity because it's meaningless, or what? >> >> >> Psychological continuity is empty in many of the cases you propose >> because no independent checking is possible. Psychological continuity, if >> interpreted to mean only some commonality of memories, temperament and the >> like, might have some content as part of the muli-dimensional character of >> personal identity. But it is by no means sufficient, and possibly (in >> extreme cases) not even necessary. >> > > I don't think checking the copies is necessary, for the reasons given > above. But do you agree at least that if the copies are checked and are > similar enough then continuity of identity is established, and it does not > matter how the copies were made? > > > I think that if there are to be 'copies', then there has to be an original > that is copied. And that copying is a physical process, subject to the > normal laws of physics and causality, so that the common origin can be > traced by independent investigation. If the purported 'copy' arose by > chance, or in another galaxy, or in another universe, so that there is no > causal connection, then use of the word 'copy' is misleading -- copies have > an original that is causally connected. Remove that causal connection and > you have no more than chance resemblance that would have to be established > by some form of information transfer. The two persons thus resembling each > other would each, quite rightly, regard themselves as independent persons, > not copies of anything. Continuity of identity is not established by mere > resemblance, no matter how close. > Call it a pseudo-copy, if you wish, it's just a matter of semantics. The copy or pseudocopy will still feel that it is a continuation of the original. > I think I have lost track of exactly what you are trying to establish by > this line of argument. Perhaps we should start with a clear statement of > what you think these copies actually achieve. > To simplify so that only one version of you is extant at a time: I think that if you died and a copy of you at the moment prior to death was made somewhere else, you would survive in that copy, regardless of how it was made or how far away it was. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
