On 04 Nov 2015, at 23:00, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 11/4/2015 1:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Nov 2015, at 18:30, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 11/3/2015 1:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Well, in machine's theology, the proof of the immortality of the
soul by Socrates is valid, but is not constructive, and its
practical aspect is dependent of you degree of appreciation of
not knowing who you (first person are).
Then, a priori computationalist immortality seems to be something
more to fear than to hope, but both computer science and salvia
can be reassuring by allowing possibilities of jumps between type
of consciousness state (but *that* is still wishful thinking, as
such jump are hard to relate with some type of death.
Once a machine is above the Gödel-Löbian treshold, it has at each
instant an infinite of futures,
Why not infinite pasts? Fundamental physics is time symmetric and
your theory of the UD doesn't have any built-in arrow of time.
?
usually, people criticize the UD by saying that it introduces a
notion of (digital) time at the start, as the UD is a program, and
its steps represent a sort of time (injection in N).
But that is not the physical time, and indeed computationalism
might imply infinite past, as we might get, with the FPI, longer
and longer histories.
and near death or near catastrophes, it continues in the closer
world consistent with its memory. If the subject identifies too
much with its memory, the experience can be unpleasant. Some
training in "let it go" can help, perhaps.
In what sense can "you" continue without memories of who you are?
Losing memories causes profound and disturbing changes in
personality.
Yes, but not necessarily change in the fact you feel surviving from
the first person view.
But when I was an infant and later a child I didn't feel I had
survived some previous life. I just felt alive in this life as I do
now and my memory of the past was limited to the few years I'd been
alive.
OK. But that does not change what I said.
Penfield made a lot of experiment confirming this, by disabling
brain (with electrodes planted in the brain of a subject) for some
time.
Confirming what? My experience of NOT feeling I had survived a
previous life is a common one confirmed by billions of people.
It is just necessary, for my point, that you feel having survive
birth. I am talking about life after death, or after amnesia, not
necessarily life before birth, which is usually hard to recover indeed
(but exists sometimes in the shape of phobia, as it seems they are
hard -wired in the brain).
To assess this the disabling has to be reversible of course (for
ethic reason too!). The salvia experience seems to confirm this too.
My father died of Alzheimers and he was a very different person,
almost a non-person, the last years of his life.
I am sorry for your father. Yet, it is hard to assess this as an
argument that he died from its first person point of view, as the
change are irreversible in this case, and it is hard to extract
information. Keep in mind that from his perspective all
continuations have to be taken into account. He might recover his
memory in some alternate computations, or backtrack in some "past",
or be happy (or not) without his memories. If the brain is too
damaged here to be said alive, then "he" will be elsewhere (no cul-
de-sac for the []p & <>t view, by definition).
But he will also be dead. To be alive in some parallel universe is
for some similar but certainly different person to be alive. In
your theory a person is not a unity, but only a loose collection of
experiences.
Not at all, it is a unity, indeed the non nameable one that we can
meta-formalize with the logic S4Grz. It is the owner of the evolving
knowledge state.
I suppose that is why you say there is only one person.
That makes the unity even more pronounced.
But that's a cheap explanation that avoids explaining why each of
us seems to be a unity;
Because we are unity, even after a self-duplication. Feeling unique is
the mark of being a (first) person. That remains invariant in all
experiences.
why our experiences and memories have the unity and consistency from
which we infer a common world and reject solipism.
The only problem which remains is the stability of the physical
appearance, and we get a non trivial embryo of explanation (the
starred material pov). The rest is already explained by the canonical
self-referential theology of the universal machine, or if you prefer,
the logic of consistency/provability.
Bruno
Brent
The dream experience illustrates also that we can "survive" with
quite different memories. That the first person does not die is
almost trivial, as death (absolute death) cannot be a memorable
first person experience: even without "eternity", there is no
notion of death from a first person point of view; life is an open
set; It is without first person boundaries.
Bruno
Brent
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