On 02 Aug 2016, at 22:41, Brent Meeker wrote:



On 8/2/2016 11:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But the argument seems somewhat circular since you assume that the different physical processes associated with location make the thoughts different.


Yes, it is more pedagogical, but the "physical" used here is not assumed to be primary, and the reasoning will just show that if we do survive with a physical digital brain, then the physical is reduced to an (fundamental and important) aspect of the "theology of number", or if you prefer, of the mathematics of universal machine self-reference.

But if you must assume the physical in order for that argument to be valid, it seems that physical is as "primary" as anything else in the ontology.

No, because the physical assumption is eliminated at step 7. And is actually never done. We assume the existence of doctor, computers, etc. But we don't assume they exist in any absolute sense. Indeed, such assumption will be negated later.

We are at step 3 only, here. Let us not make things more complex than they are. Just answer question 1 and 2, so we can proceed. Thanks.

Bruno






Brent

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