On 05 Aug 2016, at 20:20, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/5/2016 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Aug 2016, at 06:27, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/4/2016 7:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 August 2016 at 04:01, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 8/4/2016 2:57 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The problem with (3) is a general problem with multiverses. A
single, infinite universe is an example of a multiverse theory,
since there will be infinite copies of everything and every
possible variation of everything, including your brain and your
mind.
That implicitly assumes a digital universe, yet the theory that
suggests it, quantum mechanics, is based on continua; which is
why I don't take "the multiverse" too seriously.
It appears that our brains are finite state machines. Each neuron
can either be "on" or "off", there are a finite number of
neurons, so a finite number of possible brain states, and a
finite number of possible mental states. This is analogous to a
digital computer:
Not necessarily. A digital computer also requires that time be
digitized so that its registers run synchronously.
Otherwise "the state" is ill defined. The finite speed of light
means that spacially separated regions cannot be
synchronous. Even if neurons were only ON or OFF, which they
aren't, they have frequency modulation, they are not synchronous.
Synchronous digital machine can emulate asynchronous digital
machine, and that is all what is needed for the reasoning.
True, but only going to a level far below a "state of consciousness"
so that in this finer level of emulation there are no longer
identifiable states of consciousness.
There is no algorithm to identify the semantic of a program in general
(Rice theorem), but this is not a problem. The domain of the global
indeterminacy is necessarily non computable. That is why people will
in general bet on a as lower as possible substitution level. In
practice, they will take the one they can afford ...
The state of consciousness needs not to be identified by a third
person: only by the first person itself, and that is "automatic", in
virtue of computationalism, and only this is used in the reasoning.
Rather "states" are coming into being and fading away, with various
overlaps.
OK. No Problem. Eventually, the first person is associated to an
infinity of 3p states in arithmetic, and consciousness (first person
histories) emerges from the statistical interference of those
computations. The math shows that we recover a quantization allowing a
quantum logic, the symmetries at the bottom, linearity and 1p plural,
etc. It is an open problem if the Hamiltonian are physical or
geopgraphical, but note that this is an open problem also in String
Theory, and physics does not even seem to have the tools to defined
differently physics and geography. Only for this, computationalism is
quite interesting.
Bruno
Brent
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